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


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
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
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
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MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SPAIN
AND THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1953

James T. Roberts, Captain, USAF
Edwin P. Ruhmann, IV, Captain, USAF

LSSR 18-79A



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This thesis provides a synthesis of U.S.-Spanish military relationships since 1953. Each major military agreement is identified and the provisions of each are given. The results of these agreements on Spain's economy, internal politics, and military posture are examined from the U.S. point of view. The Pact of Madrid of 1953 and its five-year extension in 1963, the renegotiated Pact in 1970, and the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1976 are all examined. Public and Congressional opinion in the U.S. towards the agreements is examined, and the reasons why each of these accords was desired by both the U.S. and Spain are given. The provisions of each of the agreements is presented, followed by an analysis of the results achieved through the accords. Current U.S. political, economic, and military interest in Spain are identified, with particular attention given to the military interest. The authors offer conclusions and recommend further study.

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MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SPAIN
AND THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1953

A Thesis

Presented to the Faculty of the School of Systems and Logistics
of the Air Force Institute of Technology
Air University

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Science in Logistics Management

By

James T. Roberts, BBA
Captain, USAF

Edwin P. Ruhmann, IV, BBA
Captain, USAF

June 1979

Approved for public release;
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This thesis, written by

Captain James T. Roberts

and

Captain Edwin P. Ruhmann, IV

and approved in an oral examination, has been accepted by the undersigned on behalf of the faculty of the School of Systems and Logistics in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT
(INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS MAJOR)

DATE: 13 June 1979

Leslie M. Norton
COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The United States has provided military and economic assistance to Spain since 1953 (31:279). This assistance was first provided through executive agreements between the two governments. However, as each succeeding agreement was broader in scope the dollar value of the assistance increased (73:13). The broadened scope and increased cost of these agreements caused the United States Congress to become dissatisfied with the basis for the military relationship between the U.S. and Spain. Congress demanded that the executive agreements be replaced by a treaty, placing the relationship on a firmer and more precise legal basis (65:17214-17245; 66:26716-26717). This demand was met when the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between Spain and the United States of America was signed in Madrid on January 24, 1976 (79:9).

Problem Statement

A comprehensive synthesis of U.S. military assistance to Spain resulting from the agreements and the treaty does not exist. The information which is available is in tabular form and is not accompanied by historical and other antecedent explanations which might fully clarify or assess the effect the assistance has had on Spain's internal politics, economy, or military posture.

Justification

The need for a compilation of this information into a single document has increased with the increased importance of Spain as a partner in the defense of the West.

Spain is strategically located for the logistical support of air and ground forces in Europe and the Mid-East, and naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea (21:7-10; 22:16-23; 71:256,271,294; 72:3). The Pyrenees Mountains form a barricade between Europe and the Iberian Peninsula making Spain an ideal location for the stockpiling of supplies to support these three areas, and if needed, a fallback area for forces fighting in Europe (8:1; 21:7; 42:3). Also, entry to the Mediterranean Sea from the Atlantic Ocean can be controlled from Spain. This control would be needed to maintain the naval superiority required in the Mediterranean Sea to support military operations in the Mid-East (22:5; 66:27625).

Political changes in Europe since the signing of the first executive agreement between the United States and Spain in 1953 have increased the strategic value of Spain to western defense planners. The withdrawal of France from military participation in NATO in 1966 (62:13668) made Spain the only large land mass in western Europe available as a staging area for military operations in Europe (21:7). Following this, the instability of the Portuguese (21:10; 49:39; 74:56) and Italian (41:35; 87:3) governments in the 1970s made additional locations for logistical stockpiles, at the least, highly desirable if not necessary (22:22-23).

Thus the excellent strategic location of Spain, the reduction in the number of dependable European allies, and the stability of the anti-communist Spanish government combine to make harmonious military relations with Spain beneficial to the United States and the defense of the West. The benefits derived from these relations underscores the importance of the assistance programs and the need for the personnel involved with the administration of

these programs to comprehend not only the importance, but also the effects, of their efforts.

Literature Search

A literature search for DOD documents was conducted through the Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange. Only six documents related to Spain were found through this search, with only three of the six relating to military assistance. Of these three, such topics as Peace Alpha, the Tactical Communications Network, and Spain's possible role as a NATO member were addressed. The narrow scope of these reports make them of limited usefulness in and of themselves. Further, the subjective, rather than factual, nature of the information contained in these reports make them of limited usefulness to the authors in compiling and synthesizing data for this thesis.

A second search was conducted through the Defense Documentation Center, which produced two sources of value to the researcher. These sources addressed material relating to the Juan Carlos regime, and Spain's role in the defense of the free world. The two documents provided a list of the modern military agreements which would become the framework of this thesis. This framework was then used as the basis for further research to provide detailed facts concerning each of the elements in the framework.

The research which followed centered on three main areas. First, the Congressional Record was the source of information about the political climate in the United States at the time each of the agreements was negotiated, signed, and implemented. Next, public opinion about the agreements, and analyses of differing political positions as well as the agreements themselves were found by searching periodical literature. The New York Times was the dominant periodical used due to the abundance of information concerning U.S. - Spanish

relations it contained, the accessibility of microfilm copies of each issue needed, and the availability of a subject index to these issues. The third area of research dealt with the facts contained in each U.S. - Spanish agreement. Copies of Congressional Committee hearings which investigated the terms, conditions and reasons for the agreements, and copies of the agreements provided the factual information needed.

The data from these sources was augmented by information gained by telephone interviews with personnel at the Defense Security Assistance Agency and the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Spain. Thus, these were the sources which formed the data base used by the authors.

Objective

This thesis will provide a history of the United States-Spanish military relationship since 1953 and examine some of the results growing out of that relationship. The analysis will identify each major agreement between the two governments and examine how each has affected the economy, internal politics, and military posture of Spain.

Scope and Limitations

The agreements covered in this thesis are those which involve military aid, and were negotiated and signed after WW II. These agreements were examined from the U.S. point of view. Spanish public opinion and political views were included in the analyses only when they had a direct and significant impact on the terms and conditions of the agreements.

The analyses of the results of this agreement was, for the most part, limited to quantitative measurements of change. The qualitative measurements

included in this thesis represent the opinions and conclusions of personnel experts in the areas addressed.

The depth of this study was limited by the authors' desire to produce an unclassified document. For this thesis to become a source of meaningful information to personnel involved in the International Logistics arena, no classified information has been used in the sources selected in the preparation of this thesis.

Definition of Terms

Foreign Military Sales (FMS). Includes cash sales from stocks of the DOD; procurement for cash sales by the DOD; DOD credit sales, and DOD guarantees covering the private financing of credit sales of defense articles and defense services (75:7).

Cash Sales. Involve either cash in advance payment within a reasonable period not to exceed one hundred twenty days after delivery of the article or the rendering of the service, or payments as funds are required to meet progress payments to suppliers under a Dependable Undertaking (75:2).

Credit. Transactions approved on a case-by-case basis by the Departments of State, Treasury, and Defense, which allow payment for military export sales for periods beyond one hundred twenty days after delivery of material or performance of service (75:4).

Grant Aid. Military assistance rendered under the authority of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) for which the United States receives no dollar reimbursement (75:7).

Military Assistance Program (MAP). Authorized under the FAA, provides for the training and equipping of friendly forces so as to enable them to deter or provide effective initial defense against overt aggression. It is not intended to support forces engaged in continuous combat operations. The terms "MAP" and "Grant Aid" are often used interchangeably (75:9).

Research Questions

The overall question which this research will attempt to answer is: What have been the military relationships between Spain and the United States since 1953 and how have these relationships affected Spain? In the course of answering this primary research question several subsidiary, but related questions will be addressed. These questions are:

- (1) What commitments has the United States made to Spain regarding Spain's security as a result of military agreements between the two governments?
- (2) What effect has the assistance provided to Spain had on the Spanish economy?
- (3) What effect has the relationship between the United States and Spain had on Spain's internal politics?
- (4) What effect has the military assistance provided to Spain had on the military posture of Spain?

Procedures

There was ample information available which contains the answers to the research questions. This information was compiled and organized for consolidation and analysis.

The collection of information started with the determination of blocks of time during which public and Congressional interest in the U.S. - Spanish accords was expected to be high. Three year periods, each ending with the year an executive agreement, agreement extension, or treaty was signed, were used to form these time blocks. Every reference to Spain found in the indices to the Congressional Record, The New York Times, and the Readers Guide to Periodic Literature within each of these time blocks was reviewed to determine its relevancy to this thesis.

The Congressional Record was not only a source of important factual data needed to produce a complete document, but also acted as a guide to other government documents. Each reference to congressional hearings, presidential statements, or legislation concerned with U.S. - Spanish relations was used to locate the data needed to determine the terms and conditions of each agreement, as well as the United States' reasons for signing each of the accords. This method also provided for multiple sources of data to verify the accuracy of the facts presented in this report.

The data gathered by these procedures was then categorized and synthesized as required to answer the research questions.

Plan of Presentation

Chapter I: Introduction. This chapter states the problem and justification of the thesis, provides a brief review of existing data and the sources, defines terms, outlines objectives, establishes the scope and limitations of the research questions to be answered, and explains the procedures used to answer the research questions.

Chapter II: Background. This chapter provides the reader with a brief review of the recent political history of Spain. Beginning with the rise and fall of Spain as a world power, it covers the political turmoil existing before WW II, and briefly describes the dictatorial government that put an end to that turmoil. The chapter ends with Spain's position during WW II, and the Allies' political attitudes and policies regarding Spain following the war.

Chapter III: The First of the Modern Agreements. This chapter covers the Pact Of Madrid of 1953, which covered a span of ten years, and its renewal in 1963 for an additional five years. The reasons why the Pact was desired by both the United States and Spain are presented, as well as the public and Congressional opinion that existed toward the agreement at the time of its signing. The provisions of the Pact are given, followed by the results achieved by the assistance provided to Spain by the U.S. The chapter ends with a brief comparison of the cost of the agreement to the U.S., along with the benefits derived from it by the U.S.

Chapter IV: The Expansion of the Pact of Madrid. This chapter examines the renegotiated pact, which was signed in 1970 following two years of talks, and the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1976. The reasons why lengthy negotiations took place from 1968 to 1970, and the reasons why the accord was elevated to the status of a treaty in 1976 are presented. This is followed by a discussion of why the United States and Spain thought continued friendly relations to be mutually beneficial. Particular attention is paid to congressional concern for a precise statement of the commitment made by the U.S. to the security of Spain. The chapter is concluded by identifying the terms and results of the two accords.

Chapter V: Current United States Interest in Spain. This chapter looks at current political, economic, and military interest the U.S. has in Spain. Particular attention is paid to the military interest, examining Spain's current role regarding NATO, U.S. military objectives, and the U.S. military installations in Spain. Next, current U.S. programs supporting the Spanish military are identified and described. The programs covered are: Peace Sigma, Peace Alpha, the Tactical Control Network, Combat Grande II, and the transfer of U.S. Navy ships to the Spanish Navy. The chapter ends with a discussion of the restrictions the Spanish government has placed on the use of the U.S. military installations.

Chapter VI: Conclusions and Recommendations. This chapter answers the research questions, states the authors' conclusions drawn from the information in the preceding chapters, and includes recommendations for further study.

CHAPTER II

RECENT HISTORY

An analysis of the Spanish - U.S. relationship from 1953 to 1976 would not be wholly understandable without a brief review of the recent political history of Spain. The purpose of this review is to provide the reader with the background information needed to understand the relationship existing between Spain and the United States at the beginning of this period.

The Rise of Spanish Power

The alliance that existed between Queen Isabel of Castile and King Ferdinand III of Aragon in 1479 provided Spain with the unity necessary to achieve the status as a great European power. In 1492, the dual monarchs conquered Granada from the last of the Moorish kings in Spain and Christopher Columbus discovered America. Spain's influence over the world as a great power had been initiated (33:24). These two great events marked the emergence of Spain as a nation-state, and over a century of Spanish dominance as a world power.

The colonization of most of South and Central America, in addition to holdings in the Philippines, Azores, Cuba and the Cape Verde Islands, and the acquisition of countries in Europe such as Holland and Belgium under the Kings of Spain in their capacities as Holy Roman Emperors provided Spain with the wealth and military power necessary for world domination (33:28).

In 1556, Phillip II succeeded to the throne as the King of Spain. He failed to live up to the image of Charles V, his father, because of his continuous

procrastinations and inability to make important decisions (20:256). These weaknesses, coupled with a distrustful nature, resulted in Spain's loss of dominance in the Netherlands and parts of the Mediterranean Sea (33:45).

The Decline of Spain

Spain reached its peak as a world power in the year 1588. In this year Phillip II had sent his "Invincible Armada" to conquer England, but the destruction of the armada by storms and the English defending fleet under Sir Francis Drake and Lord Howard marked the beginning of Spanish decline, and opened the door for England's colonization of America (33:45).

From the sixteenth century to the turn of the twentieth century Spain built and lost a great global empire. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries such events as the independence of American colonies, the Carlist Wars, the Peninsular War, and the Napoleonic Wars, coupled with territorial sales, served to reduce Spain to the status of a lesser power with but little authority or prestige in world or European councils (5:2).

In 1898, the Spanish-American War began, triggered by the destruction of the U.S. battleship "Maine" and by the reports filtering out of Cuba detailing the atrocities committed by the Spanish troops (5:452). On April 25, 1898 the U.S. Congress declared that war had existed since the 21st of April, and the U.S. forces proceeded to defeat the Spanish in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines (4:310-311).

On December 10, 1898 a peace treaty was signed by the U.S. and Spain and ratified by the U.S. Senate on February 6, 1899. The terms of the treaty provided for the freedom of Cuba and the cessation of Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippine Islands to the U.S. (5:474; 31:37). This loss of Spanish colonies marked the lowest point in Spain's status as a world power (4:311).

Pre WW II

Modern Spain and the conditions that contributed to the Spain as we know it today, began in 1902 upon the succession to the Spanish throne of Alphonso XIII. His reign was continuously marred by growing anarchism resulting from the activities of groups such as the Catalan and Basque regionalists, Republican and Proletarian parties, and the Spanish Army (45:439).

This growing anarchy and the lack of stability in the government contributed to Alphonso XIII's increased support of a military man to run the government as a dictator. In 1923, General Primo de Rivera was appointed by Alphonso XIII to such a position in the hope that a "strong man" possessing military training, and with the support of the military forces, could bring strength and stability to the civilian government, in order to control communist terrorism and industrial unrest (31:38; 45:440).

However, General Primo de Rivera's efforts to reform both the military rank structure and the civilian government failed (31:38). General Rivera was forced into retirement by the loss of military support, a severe economic slump, and the King's declining confidence. This failure, coupled with a growing mismanagement of the government and the threat of civil war, forced Alphonso XIII to abdicate his throne in 1931 (31:38-39; 45:440).

After Alphonso XIII's abdication, Spain was characterized by a lack of political stability, increased unrest, militancy, and violence. Out of this chaos, a multiparty coalition was formed in 1931 and proclaimed itself the Second Republic. Niceto Alcala Zamora was appointed as president. Elections were held in June which resulted in a majority for the "Left Republicans," a radical group, who then proceeded to name Manuel Azana as Prime Minister. The policies instituted by the "Left Republicans" were anti-church, pro-regional autonomy, and pro-land reform (4:326-328; 44:360r).

After a stormy two year period of anti-clericalism, general elections were held which brought into power a group known as the Spanish Confederation of the Autonomous Right (CEDA). CEDA, under the leadership of Gil Robles, immediately expressed its opposition towards President Zamora and Prime Minister Azana, and succeeded in forcing the reversal of the Second Republic's policies (4:329). Hence, the government now consisted of individuals who supported both pro- and anti-church, and pro- and anti-regionalism policies (44:360r). This division in the government contributed to the alienation of both leftists and rightists, and the promised land reforms never became a reality (44:360r). Increasing public opposition to the Zamora government led to its resignation and to another general election.

The general elections of 1935 produced a number of irregularities. Claims of fraud and numerous recounts of the ballots led to increasing disorder and the extreme political polarization between the left (Republicans) and the right (Nationalists) (4:330; 31:40). The recount established the "Popular Front" as victors, which was taken as a signal by the leftists for the beginning of a revolution. President Zamora was removed from office and replaced by Prime Minister Azana (31:41).

Spain was confronted with a paralyzing political upheaval, with assassinations and bombings commonplace. Increased terrorism and the assassination of Jose Calvo Sotelo, leader of the National Block Party, was the signal for the military forces to act against the civilian government (4:330; 31:40-41). The Spanish Civil War (1936-39) had begun.

Francisco Franco, in October 1936, was named by a junta of Nationalist generals as Generalissimo and Caudillo of the Army and as chief of state of the Nationalists government (4:333; 31:42; 44:330).

Franco, born in El Ferrol on December 4, 1892, received his military training and officer's commission in the Army's Infantry Academy at Toledo, Spain (84:17). During the time after commissioning in 1911 until his appointment as commander of the Spanish Foreign Legion in 1923, Franco's attitudes were shaped by Spain's progression from one political crises to another. Primo de Rivera's downfall had taught Franco the first lesson of dictators: crush or be crushed (84:20). In addition, military dogmas held by the Spanish military during this time established Great Britain and France as perennial enemies and the United States as an uncouth, protestant braggart, preaching democracy while wanting territorial spoils in Spanish America (84:18).

These political values, the military successes experienced by Franco in the Moroccan uprisings, and his appointment as the youngest general in Europe in 1934 prepared him for the leadership role in the bloodiest civil war in his nation's history (84:19). The civil war was a long and costly battle in terms of lives and economic conditions between the Nationalists and Republicans. "The Spanish Civil War tore Spain limb from limb, destroying the economy of the nation and wreaking havoc in every phase of Spanish life [48:73]."

The struggle between the two parties continued for a period of four years, with the leadership of Francisco Franco and the armed forces under his command continually supporting the Nationalist cause. Due to Franco's prowess in battlefield strategy and the aid received from Italy (30,000 troops) and Germany (6,000 troops plus weapons and other supplies), Franco and the Nationalists won the civil war. Hostilities came to an end on March 18, 1939. It has been estimated that over one million civilian and military lives were lost in this fratricidal conflict (48:74).

The Franco Government

The government under Franco was a constitutional monarchy headed by a Chief of State. There were two fundamental parts of government under the Chief of State: the political and the administrative structures.

The Cortes was the political portion of the government. It was a unicameral legislature with the chief mission of preparing legislation whose sanction rested with Franco, the Chief of State. The Cortes lacked independent authority, and because only a portion of the members were elected it did not necessarily represent the will of the people (31:208; 44:335).

The central government was the administrative structure. The president of the central government was appointed by the Chief of State. Franco was both the Chief of State and the president of the central government. As the Chief of State, Franco had the powers to declare war or peace, and had veto and approval power on all legislation prepared by the Cortes. As the president of the central government, Franco appointed the ministers of the central government, several of whom were ex officio members of the Cortes. These powers gave Franco complete control and "absolute authority in Spain [31:212]." The first two acts of Franco outlawed political parties, due to their intransigence and responsibility for past anarchy, and established the "caudillaje" - command by one person.

The ruling principle for Franco's state was proclaimed to be respect for the dignity, integrity, and liberty of the human person (44:335). The legality of the state rested with the four basic laws created and passed into law during his reign.

The first of these laws was the Constituent Law of the Cortes which was passed in July 1942 (31:215; 44:330). It established the Cortes as a unicameral legislature and defined its authority.

The second law was known as the "Statute of the Spanish People." It was approved in July, 1945, and established Roman Catholicism as the state religion, but guaranteed religious freedom, and further provided legal protection to the family unit as the natural, fundamental institution of society (31:208; 44:335).

The third law was known as the "National Referendum Law" of October, 1945. It extended suffrage to all citizens over twenty one years of age (31:209; 44:330).

The fourth and last of the "state legality" laws was the Law of Succession passed in July, 1947. This law designated Franco by name as the Chief of State. It empowered Franco to nominate his successor, or to revoke the nomination, and required a national referendum to make any changes to these four laws(31:209; 44:330).

The Organic Law of December, 1966, consolidated the four basic laws (31:210-211). These laws effectively established a "social and representative Catholic State [44:334] ."

WW II

At the beginning of World War II, Franco viewed the war as consisting of two separate and distinct conflicts (31:266). The first was between Russia and Germany in which his anti-communist views made him pro-Germany, while in the second between Germany and the west, he remained neutral due to Spain's weakened military and economic conditions as a result of the Spanish Civil War (31:261-266).

Spain's involvement in WW II was small insofar as Germany was concerned. Spain contributed one army division known as the "Blue Division" to support German forces on the Russian front (31:266). However, the Spanish position of neutrality towards the Western War meant that Germany could not cross the Pyrenees Mountains. This effectively supported the Allied cause by preventing Germany from establishing bases within the Iberian peninsula and capturing Gibraltar, and thus from controlling the entrance to and the exit from the Mediterranean Sea (58:A1537).

Throughout the war Spain had continually changed its policy of neutrality to support either the Axis or Allies, depending on which one appeared to be winning the war. By 1944, because of German losses and an Allied embargo on petroleum products to Spain, Spain's support of Germany was withdrawn and a position of neutrality in both Eastern and Western wars was adopted (31:267).

Post WW II

Following WW II, because of Spain's pro-German position in the beginning of the war, and the dictatorial form of the Franco government, Spain was "branded by the Potsdam declaration of 1945 as unfit to associate with the United Nations [4:334] " and therefore was denied membership in the world organization (48:75). Further condemnation of the Spanish government resulted in the low point of U.S. - Spanish relations when the U.S. supported a United Nations' resolution in 1946 to abstain from the exchange of ambassadors. These actions were attempts to force the replacement of, or changes to the Franco government towards a more democratic and less repressive government (31:270).

By 1949, the U.S. realized that the isolation policies directed at Spain were not producing the desired results (58:A1537). With the advent of the Berlin Blockade and the imperialism exhibited towards western Europe by communist

Russia, normalization of relations with Spain became desirable to the U.S. for strategic reasons¹ (5:812; 31:274). "Facist Franco of Spain took on a better odor as the Cold War grew hotter [5:812] ." The decisions in 1951 to send an ambassador to Madrid, to grant a loan of \$62.5 million from the Export-Import Bank, and to grant \$125 million of foreign aid by the United States Congress are evidence of the change in the United States' attitudes as well as the change in United States - Spanish relations (31:46; 33:96; 45:76).

It was in this environment of changing relations between the United States and Spain that the negotiations resulting in the Pact of Madrid of 1953 were begun.

¹The strategic value of Spain is more fully explained in the discussion of the Pact of Madrid of 1953 in Chapter III.

CHAPTER III

THE FIRST OF THE MODERN AGREEMENTS

The first of the modern military agreements between the United States and Spain was the Pact of Madrid.

The accord followed a gradual change in U.S. policy that was initiated in 1951 with the arrival of American Ambassador Stanton Griffis in Madrid. The appointment was viewed by the public in the United States and the world community as a drastic change in American foreign policy (10:4).

Support by the U.S. Army and Navy for strategic bases in Spain, as well as support by a majority of congressmen who viewed the Franco government as anticommunist, resulted in pressures that prompted the appointment of Stanton Griffis by President Truman in 1951 (37:2). Further realizations that the dictatorship of Francisco Franco would continue and that a policy of isolation was not accomplishing the desired reform in the Spanish government, caused the United States to seek an agreement with Spain based on purely strategic and economic realities (52:6).

With this change in U.S. policy towards Spain, the United States' long-term position was to gradually induce Spain to play a larger role within Western Europe's political and economic integration, while at the same time encouraging the European nations to rid themselves of their anti-Franco sentiments that were still very strong during the period following WW II (50:9). Although the Pact of Madrid was not expected to put pressure on Franco to make political concessions within Spain, the United States wanted to promote gradual political reform.

The Pact of Madrid

U.S. Reasons for Wanting the Pact. Spain has great strategic importance because of its location, which could facilitate the logistics support of both the U.S. and friendly forces (see Figure 1).

The location of Spain was seen as a strategic plus for the United States and its allies in the 1953 time period. The establishment of air bases in Spain would permit the B-47 bomber to conduct combat missions against the Soviet Union and return without refueling stops. On the other hand, the main fighter of the Russian Air Force, the MIG-15, did not have the capability to fly the distance to Spain in order to strike U.S. bases (42:3; 43:77). In essence, the location of Air Force bases on the Iberian peninsula would allow the United States to carry out bombing missions against Russian targets without fear of retaliatory bombings of its own installations. In addition, the distance to Spain from continental Russia over French air space negated the chance of a "first strike" capability for the U.S.S.R. air forces.

As the threat of Russian influence grew more uncertain and the unstable political situation in France further deteriorated, Spain became more important in the eyes of U.S. strategists as a "fallback" area and logistics supply point. The Pyrenees Mountains located on the Spanish-French border were considered one of the strongest natural defense lines in Europe. Coupled with the fact that Spain is surrounded on three sides by the sea, the Pyrenees were seen as a good secondary line of defense against Red Army overruns in Western Europe (8:1).

Following the Berlin Blockade in 1948, U.S. strategists viewed Spain as an area where secure storage of bulk military cargoes could be stockpiled and

FIGURE 1




defended (42:3). The thrust of U.S. planning was based on a reduction of shipping time during war to our allied forces situated within Western European nations.

Further logistics support through Spain, to both the Mid-East and the Mediterranean Basin, was seen by the United States as a major asset (see Figure 2). The use of Spanish ports to stockpile fuel for the 6th Fleet located within the Mediterranean Sea and the establishment of dry dock repair sites would further the U.S. aim of an established and well-supported naval presence in the area (16:1; 43:77). In addition, the establishment of air bases on Spanish soil was deemed by the USAF as a means of providing alternative bases for U.S. aircraft in the event that the American military was forced out of politically unstable North Africa (42:3).

Due to the fact that the United States' ostracism of Spain did not impair the Franco government and that the Spanish nation's dictatorship was extremely anti-communist, support for an agreement continued to strengthen. A subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee declared that a higher priority and increased aid to Spain be provided. "The objective of both the United States and Spain is the defeat of communism - the common enemy [3:5]." Remarks from American Ambassador Stanton Griffis provided further support for an accord by highlighting Spain's contribution to the Allied cause during WW II. His position was that Spanish neutrality prevented Germany from crossing the Pyrenees, thereby negating German control of Gibraltar and the Mediterranean (58:A1537).

Spanish Reasons for Wanting the Pact. The Spanish were in desperate need of economic aid from any source they could tap. The effects of the Spanish Civil

FIGURE 2
THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIN



War, some fourteen years before, still lingered on. Spain continuously impressed its importance as a strategic ally upon the United States. This concept was furthered by an announcement from the Portugese government that "unless the Spaniards stop any Red Assault at the Pyrenees, Portugese defense efforts would be futile [57:A682-A683] ."

Franco, realizing an advantage, insisted on an economic formula that would not only strengthen Spain's military forces, but also provide liberal assistance to her failing economy. In conjunction with economic aid, the Spanish Chief of State foresaw military aid as a means of reinforcing Spain's military forces so that it could provide its own defense. Franco was quoted as saying:

. . . it is not our purpose to be defended by others, but to defend ourselves by preparing our bases and by strengthening our defenses with help from the U.S. to meet any possible aggression [23:4] .

Public Opinion in the United States

Public opinion within the U.S. for and against the Pact of Madrid was hotly debated. Proponents of the Pact provided arguments ranging from a call for consistency in our Grant Aid programs to the strategic importance of Spain's location and its anti-communist dictatorship.

One argument proposed quite often involved the aid given by the United States to communist Yugoslavia.

How can the United States refuse aid to one state, Spain, ruled by a dictator, Franco, with a Facist Falangist type government, when it gives aid to another state, Yugoslavia, ruled by a dictator, Tito, with a Nationalist Communist type government [6:6] ?

Even though the Franco regime had been characterized by some as a government wanting an unlimited outlay of money for the unlimited purpose of bolstering the Spanish economy, public opinion appeared to be swayed by the strength of both the strategic value and anti-communist arguments (32:181).

Opposition to a U.S. - Spain agreement in the public sector was most denounced by the labor unions. The unions believed that "funds made available to Facist dictatorships are not used to improve the conditions of their oppressed peoples - they are used to reinforce the naked power of the dictator [81:5]." Further opposition to the accord was voiced by those concerned with the cost of rebuilding the Spanish military and economy. Due to the ambiguity of the proposed agreement and the unknown cost, many foresaw a great expense in the re-equipping of Spain's armed forces (7:9).

Overall, the strategic value of Spain seemed to override all other considerations in public sentiment. Many felt that if we went to war, the United States would ask Franco for help, so why not ask for it now (34:21)? Others of the American public held an apathetic attitude towards the agreement and considered it as commonplace due to other alliances the United States had entered into with Korea, Indo-China, and NATO (2:22).

Congressional Debates and Attitudes

Debate on the issue of a U.S. - Spain pact within the United States Congress had become very vociferous, with newspaper editorials and congressional divisions disclosing those congressmen aligned with and against the proposed agreement.

Supporters of the Accord. The supporters of the accord stressed the positive aspects of strategic and logistical value. Remarks such as the following summed up the feelings of many congressmen:

We (the U.S.) don't agree with Franco's government, but Spain's location would be of great value in our defense against Russia. Also, we deal with other dictators for the same reason, and Franco is anti-communist which Tito of Yugoslavia is not. We also worked with Portugal, which has a dictator and signed the Atlantic Pact [57:391-392].

Further justification of an agreement was provided through comparisons of Spain's ability to provide military assistance versus that of Great Britain, France, and Italy. Although these three countries had been receiving American aid for two years, they could only provide approximately ten combat divisions for the defense of Western Europe. Spain, on the other hand, was able to provide at least twenty-three divisions without the benefit of the massive aid programs (57:A4631). In support of this viewpoint, Representative Sikes of Florida called for Spain to be a part of western defense, with the Spanish military forces being used to support American divisions in the event that a war in Western Europe should occur (57:8283).

Additional support voiced by congressmen repeated the points that Spain was needed in NATO and that most of the evils inherent in a dictatorship were not in evidence within the Spanish government (57:10259-10260). A Congressional Study Mission on Europe further supported an agreement with Spain and summarized the positive aspects of its findings. These findings stated that Spain was violently anti-communist, held an important geographical and strategic position, was a good investment for U.S. resources, and should be prepared for NATO acceptance (43:94).

Opposition to the Accord. Congressional opponents to the proposed agreement appeared to base their opposition on two points: Spain was a fascist dictatorship; and acceptance of Spain by the U.S. would result in the loss of Western European allies. Many who did not favor the agreement, such as Senator Javits of New York, were afraid the United States would alienate its European allies if a relationship was established and aid provided to Spain (43:83). Such a reaction would have nullified any hopes of a strong NATO alliance. Others held that U.S. aid to a country controlled by a Facist dictator such as Franco, under an

authoritarian and monopolistic political party - the Falange - would serve to erode the United States' moral standing with other governments of the world after so severely denouncing the fascist parties of Germany and Italy after WW II (43:93). Evidence of this possibility was signaled earlier by the efforts of England, France, and Russia to block a multilateral cooperation agreement between the U.S. and Spain (43:79)

Overall, the strategic value of Spain, due to its intermediate location between the United States, the Mid-East, and the Mediterranean Sea, was greater than the political considerations identified with the possible alienation of our allies (68:4). Congress fully supported economic cooperation with the Spanish government in order to strengthen Spain's economy and military defenses (84:6885-6899). To support these views, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended aid to Spain in the amount of \$200 million (9:16). Based on the recommendation above, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee report referencing Spain as a "good investment" the U.S. Congress voted \$125 million in support of the pact before it was signed in 1953 (3:5; 15:10).

Debate, during this time, was viewed as involving the strategic importance of Spain versus the dislike of Franco's Fascist government. Approval of the agreement by the U.S. Congress was influenced by two factors: the passage of time had allowed the fascist nature of Franco's Spain during WW II to fade; and the invasion of Korea by communist forces emphasized the aggressive nature of communist governments (83:15).

Congress vs the Executive Branch

During the period of 1950 to 1953 a considerable difference of opinion towards a U.S. - Spanish agreement emerged between Congress and the Executive Branch. Accusations made by United States' Congressmen indicated that a

\$62.5 million loan approved by Congress through the Export-Import Bank had been halted by the State Department and President Truman (57:1130). Reasons for this challenge to congressional authority were not immediately evident. Aid had been provided to Yugoslavia in 1951 on the basis of a wheat crop totaling 80% of pre-WW II levels, while Spain received no aid and had only 65% of its pre-WW II wheat yield in that same year (57:1130). Due to the fact that both houses of Congress had passed the loan by an overwhelming majority, speculation as to President Truman's reasons for not following the congressional order was rife. Further offense was provided when the Executive Branch also hesitated in providing Spanish aid approved by Congress in 1950 in the amount of \$125 million (58:6442).

Reasons for these rejections by the Executive Branch prompted several congressmen to voice their own opinions. By and far the most common criticism was the charge that President Truman was involved in an election year and did not want to appear to support a dictatorship (17:5). While other views expressed the fact that the President would "pass the buck" to the next administration (18:4).

The mood amongst the two Houses of Congress could only be described as one of "outrage" that the State Department had usurped Congressional authority(57:A4553). Most congressmen saw the failure of the administration to provide approved aid to Spain as blatant attempts to ignore the will of Congress (58:6442). Representative Latham of New York went so far as to blame the "bungling State Department" for its failure to provide aid to Spain (57:A4553).

Overall Considerations

As can be seen, much debate existed as to a U.S. pact with Spain. However, a summation of statements by Senators Humphrey and Proxmire did

provide that although the U.S. normally defended cut-offs of military aid to communist dictators, they did agree that aid should be provided to Spain for security reasons (60:11106-11107). With support from both the military and Congress, based on the strategic value of the Spanish location, the Pact of Madrid was signed by President Eisenhower and Francisco Franco on September 26, 1953.

Provisions of the Pact


The Pact of Madrid of 1953 was to be in force for ten years with the provision of two five year extensions, unless either government decided to terminate the agreement (80:1901).

Termination of the agreement could be accomplished by either party at the end of the initial ten year period, or at the end of each of the five-year extensions. If such action were undertaken by either the United States or Spain, then a six month period of consultation would ensue for renegotiation (80:1901). In the event that neither party could reach an understanding the pact would be terminated one year later.

Concessions to the United States. For the economic and military assistance that the U.S. was to provide to Spain, it received the rights to maintain and utilize, jointly with the Spanish government, facilities for military purposes on the Iberian Peninsula (80:1898-1899).

These military concessions provided for the placement of American naval and air bases in territories under Spanish jurisdiction (see Figure 3). The Rota Navy Base at Cadiz, Spain was established in order to support the Mediterranean 6th Fleet with fuel, supplies, and light vessel dry dock facilities (16:1; 31:281). This facility greatly enhanced the logistics support of U.S. naval

FIGURE 3
MAJOR UNITED STATES MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN SPAIN



forces by decreasing pipeline time of essential supplies. Air Bases were placed at Moron, Torrejon, and Zaragoza in order to further enhance the strategic bombing mission of the B-47 (16:1; 31:281). These installations provided the United States with the capability to supplement its power by enhancing its ability to strike the U.S.S.R. with a larger number of intercontinental bombers. Further, the location of the bases was such that Russian aircraft could be intercepted over Western Europe or the Mediterranean Sea before reaching the Iberian Peninsula (16:1).

In addition to the various bases a 485-mile pipeline was constructed from Rota to Zaragoza to assure delivery of aviation fuel to the northern air bases which the Spanish Transportation system could not support (86:57). The fuel line was used to support the B-47 missions, which used more petroleum in one afternoon than the whole railway system of Spain could supply in one month (84:290).

Further construction was accomplished that consisted of seven radar sites. The function of these sites were to supplement NATO's radar system (86:57).

Concessions to Spain. For Spain, the Pact of Madrid provided economic, military, and grant aid assistance to its government. Economic aid provided in the amount of \$1.3 billion from 1953 to 1963 was used by the Franco government to stabilize Spain's economy (73:39; 61:21839-21840). U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP) funds of \$491 million and foreign military sales (FMS) totalling \$4.5 million during the same period allowed Spain to modernize its military forces (71:260).

In addition to the above military and economic aid, costs to the U.S. for construction of the four bases amounted to \$395.6 million, with outlays for the Zaragoza-Rota pipeline totaling \$25 million (73:39-41).

The Extension of 1963. The Pact of Madrid was renewed in 1963 for a period of five years. This agreement provided that any threat to the security or integrity of either country, or to the U.S. - Spain joint facilities was a matter of common concern (55:197; 12:1).

Due to the loss of United States' military bases in Morocco in 1963 and the break down of negotiations with Portugal for U.S. military installations in the Azores in 1962, the bases in Spain became more important for the defense and logistical support of Europe and the Mediterranean Basin (22:13-14). Although the renegotiated defense agreement did not change the basic structure of the 1953 pact, the U.S. did request that it be allowed to construct a \$250 million addition to the naval facilities at Rota to provide accommodation for Polaris submarines (24:2).

For the continuance of an American military presence in Spain and the upgrading of the naval facility at Rota to support Polaris submarines, the U.S. granted military aid of \$100 million and FMS credits totaling \$211 million to Spain (12:1; 55:197; 71:260).

The results of the renegotiation provided the United States with a perpetuation of its presence as a deterrent to communist encroachment from the east. These bases in Spain provided the "backbone of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) cold war defense in southwestern Europe [53:29]." In addition, the continuation of Spain as a U.S. ally provided the closure of a semicircle around the U.S.S.R. (58:A1537).

Accomplishments of the Agreement

Progress towards one of the earliest objectives of the U.S. in its relationship with Spain also appeared to be showing promise. Representative Monagan of Hawaii on September 11, 1963, noted that even some of Franco's most severe critics admitted that the Spanish government had shown signs of liberalizations and relaxed some of its rigid control over the Spanish populace (61:16762).

The Pact of Madrid and its subsequent renegotiation in 1963 resulted in the elevation of the status of the Spanish government by virtue of an agreement with a major world power (51:14). The economic recovery Spain experienced, after the devastation of the Spanish Civil War, WW II, plus the exclusion of Spain from the Marshall Plan, has been described as a miracle (14:29; 84:285). One of the reasons given for the recovery has been the American aid provided under the Pact of Madrid. " The United States played a leading and perhaps indispensable role in keeping the Spanish economy afloat [86:39] ." Although U.S. economic aid never exceeded \$200 million in any one year, it did provide one-third of all Spanish imports in the early years and freed the Franco regime to turn its attention upon unemployment and education (84:312). This increased strength of Spain's economy was evidenced in the U.S. Congressional Record on May 4, 1961, when it was noted that the Spanish repaid a \$50 million loan to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) far ahead of schedule, cancelled lines of credit with the IMF and American banks totaling \$96 million, and repaid \$24 million to the OEEC (59:7294-7295). In fact, Spain's Gross National Product (GNP) grew in real terms at an average yearly rate of 7.5% from 1960-1968. The only country to exceed this annual growth rate was Japan (86:5).

The effects of military aid and assistance to Spain improved the Spanish ability for defense and allowed the Franco government to reduce the number of

personnel in the armed forces (84:47). In 1951 Spain's army totaled 350,000 personnel with 1921 vintage small arms, and with tanks and artillery that had been used during the civil war (1936-1939) (57:A682-A683). The Air Force consisted of 300 German Heinkel bombers and Messerschmidt propeller fighters, of which only 100 were flyable, and none were jets (57:A682-A683; 84:50). The Spanish Navy was near extinction due to the fact that it was composed of only six cruisers (newest built in 1936) and a few smaller ships (57:A682-A683). En toto, the Spanish armed forces were weak and ill equipped.

The United States entered into a massive military aid program that attempted to vitalize and modernize all branches of the Spanish armed forces. This assistance provided Spain with a means of self defense and the United States a Defensive position in Southwestern Europe.

By 1964, Spain's normal peacetime army had been cut to 180,000 men, composed of 29,000 officers, 32,000 NCOs, and 119,000 volunteers. The infantryman was armed with the Spanish Ceterne and Belgian automatic rifles. Armored units had been upgraded with the introduction of M-47 and M-48 tanks, and the artillery units had greatly increased their firepower and accuracy by use of the U.S. 155 and 105 milimeter howitzers, being produced under license in Spanish factories. In addition, through American advisory groups and training received within the United States, Spanish officers were being prepared for the utilization of the Hawk ground-to-air guided missile (84:47-48).

The Spanish Air Force (SAF), by 1954, had received more than 400 North American F-86 Sabrejets, equipped with the lethal, heat-seeking Sidewinder missile through U.S. aid. The United States had also furnished Spain with C-54 troop and cargo carriers, T-6 and T-33 jet trainers, and helicopters. During

1964 the SAF was to receive F-104s from the U.S. and buy its own F-5s (86:50-52).

Since 1953, the U.S. - Spanish agreements have brought sweeping changes to the Spanish Navy (84:52). Due to Spain's strategic location, astride the entrance to the Mediterranean, the U.S. has provided more than \$100 million to modernize the fleet during this period. United States shipyards have built five destroyers, a submarine for training, twelve minesweepers, eighteen auxiliary vessels, and two 13,000 ton craft to serve as transports of amphibious forces and as a command post. All of these comprised part of U.S. aid to Spain. At the end of 1964, the Spanish Navy was composed of a 4,700 ton light cruiser, three 8,000 ton cruisers, twenty-nine destroyers, twenty frigates, and approximately 40 smaller ships. Modernization of the older vessels included upgrading by installation of American sonar, radar, and electronic fire control systems. In addition to the above, introduction of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) equipment was deemed necessary by the United States in order to counter Russian submarines in a wartime environment. Hence, by 1964 the Spanish Navy had also received nine Bell-47 and seven Sikorsky-55 helicopters equipped with ASW listening and sonar devices (84:52-54).

By the end of the period of 1953-1964, U.S. military aid provided through the Pact of Madrid in the form of both training and hardware had improved Spain's ability to defend itself by no small degree. In the words of one American officer, "They want to learn. They work. They're damn good [84:49]." Further evidence of the growing strength and ability of the Spanish Navy to now integrate its defense with friendly forces was the massive U.S. - Spanish naval maneuvers conducted under code Name Steel Pike 1 in 1964 (84:53).

Cost vs Benefit

The use of foreign aid to Spain was to further the U.S. objectives of building and maintaining an important ally in Southwestern Europe, i.e. to provide another nation-state to the common concern in the defense against communist aggression from the east. By 1964 Spain provided, with the infusion of both American economic and military aid, a friend that the U.S. could depend upon in the event of another world war.

Although much controversy arose over the price tag affixed to Spanish aid, it must be pointed out that the military aid provided to Spain reduced the need for defense spending within the U.S. forces which would have been needed otherwise. Therefore, only the excess of assistance provided to Spain over the additional spending needed within American forces to offset the absence of Spanish military forces should be considered the true cost of this aid (38:7-10).

In addition to the above, consideration must be given to the Military Assistance Program (MAP). Although the MAP provided hardware and training to the Spanish, it must be realized that the funds necessary to buy the equipment were spent within the United States. Therefore MAP is not purely a "give-away" program (29). With this clarification of the Military Assistance Program, and the realization that over 70% of the material for the U.S. bases in Spain was purchased in the United States, it becomes clear that the American economy benefitted from the aid provided to Spain (84:291).

Benefits from foreign aid include increased employment, which results in a decrease in the cost of unemployment to the U.S. (39:46). Even though some congressmen voiced concern of the effect of this additional government spending on inflation, the additional outlays for foreign aid to Spain could have been inflationary only if the United States' economy had been at full employment (54).

Although the foreign aid provided through the Pact of Madrid of 1953 and its renegotiation of 1963 did not guarantee economic progress or assured political stability in Spain, it did assert a positive influence in these areas and provided the Spanish government an opportunity to strengthen its economy, modernize its military, and approach its goal of equality with the Western European countries.

CHAPTER IV

THE EXPANSION OF THE PACT OF MADRID

The renegotiation of the Pact of Madrid of 1953 was again requested by Spain at the end of the first extension in 1968.

Why Renegotiation

The Spanish, as evidenced during negotiations in 1963, had formed an exaggerated concept of the value of the Spanish bases to the United States government (14:14). This tendency of Spain to magnify the importance of the bases to the United States, coupled with strong anti-U.S. feelings generated after the H-bomb incident at Palomares in 1966, contributed to the Spanish request for a sum of money far larger than the United States was willing to pay (66:24066).²

Further reason for the request for renegotiation of the Pact of Madrid by the Spanish government was evidenced in Spain's desire to strengthen the United States defense commitment to Western Europe. Spain wanted wording to the effect that the U.S. was obligated to defend Western Europe "of which Spain is an integral part [65:4293]."

As noted previously, the extension of 1963 provided the Spaniards with MAP and FMS credits totaling approximately \$311 million (55:197). The quid pro quo provided the United States with military installations in Spain that were considered part of the southern flank of NATO (71:260).

²This incident resulted when nuclear weapons were jettisoned from an American B-52 aircraft after a mid-air collision with a KC-135 refueler. Although there was no nuclear detonation, a small amount of radiation was released upon impact.

Bargaining Positions

Although the United States believed that the U.S. - Spanish bases were of strategic value, the widely held consensus by the U.S. Administration and Congress provided that no bases were "vital" to the defense of the West (63:6).

This contrast with the Spanish opinion, plus the fact that Spain requested \$1.2 billion for the continued use of the bases, set the stage for the bargaining positions of both countries during 1968 (63:6).

Spain had fixed its price at \$1.2 billion, while the United States had offered only \$100 million. As negotiations continued, the Spaniards lowered their requirements to \$700 million and the American government increased its proposal to \$140 million (63:6). Evidence of an impasse in the terms of a new agreement grew stronger.

Essentially, Spain felt that the continued presence of U.S. bases on Spanish soil exposed their country to increased risks of attack similar to that of the other NATO countries without the political and economic benefits enjoyed by the NATO member nations (19:9). This attitude of the Spanish government, coupled with anti-American feelings generated by the H-bomb incident, along with disapproval of the United States involvement in Viet Nam, provided Franco with the leverage necessary to support a "hard-line" approach around the bargaining table (56:15; 66:24066).

Even though the United States' negotiators appeared to agree with the Spanish contention of the increased risks Spain might be facing, the American administration would not accept wording within the text of a new agreement that would imply a defense commitment equal to Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty (66:4293).

The North Atlantic Treaty establishes the principle of collective security for its members. According to Article 5, "an armed attack

against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all" to be resisted by all. NATO has as further objectives the maintenance of economic and political stability among its members and the establishment of closer ties among them in general, and endeavors to achieve these objectives through an intricate multinational organization. The purpose of this organization is to give central direction to the military and economic policies of the members on the basis of negotiated agreements among them [36:579] .

With these differences of opinion between the two countries, plus the facts that the U.S. Congress had cut military aid, the Viet Nam war was exerting a strain on the U.S. economy, and an election year was approaching, the impending executive agreement between the United States and Spain approached a stalemate (19:9).

After much debate and bargaining between the two countries, it was mutually agreed on June 20, 1969, that the Pact of Madrid of 1953 would be extended to September 26, 1970, retroactive to 1968 (65:17230; 69:15). The basic tenet of this extension was to allow both the U.S. and Spanish governments to ". . . determine a new relationship of cooperation between the two countries . . . [69:15] ." The cost of this extension was to be \$50 million of Grant Aid, \$25 million to be provided to Spain for each year of the two year agreement (70:5700).

Why the United States Wanted the 1970 Agreement

At the end of the two year extension in 1970, the Spanish and United States governments again began full-scale negotiations to reach a mutually acceptable defense agreement.

The United States, since 1953, had continually demonstrated its intentions of providing Spain with the aid necessary to "ease" Spain's acceptance into NATO. To do this, the U.S. government had provided Spain's military forces with the capability to monitor the air space above its own territory and out into the

Mediterranean area. Hence, the American government did not want to relinquish the location of the Spanish bases from which it could monitor and provide strategic information to NATO via the Spanish alert system (76:29903).

In relation to the above, the United States was also concerned with the withdrawal of France from NATO. The departure of the French had caused a serious gap in the Western Alliance, and Spain was seen as an immediate replacement to strengthen Southwestern Europe (63:1428).

Additional concern for the security of the Mediterranean area was realized when it became apparent that the Soviet Navy was making a serious bid to become the dominant power in this region for the first time ever (71:257). An increase from two ships in 1926 to forty-seven ships in 1968 made the Russian fleet nearly equal to the fifty vessels of the United States 6th Fleet (64:30897). This, coupled with increasing evidence that the Soviet fleet was equipped with anti-ship cruise missiles, and conventional and nuclear powered submarines formed an offensive threat that provided additional incentive for a continued relationship with Spain (71:257).

This changing military balance highlights the importance to NATO and to us (United States) of the friends we have left on the Southern Flank, and of the base rights they provide [71:257] .

Hence, Spain was perceived as providing support and protection to the United States 6th Fleet, as well as a means of preventing Soviet domination of the sea lanes from the oil-rich Mid-East (70:5700; 71:258).

Prior withdrawal of American forces from Morocco and the closure of Wheelus AFB in Libya on June 30, 1970, strengthened the Spanish bargaining position (70:5699). These events, plus the intelligence reports indicating several thousand Soviet advisors in the Mid-East, indicated that Spain and its military forces were needed to supplement the one U.S. base in Italy and three in Turkey

(64:30897; 71:257). In fact, Spain represented one-half of the U.S. installations in the Mediterranean area (64:30897).

Further reason for a U.S. - Spanish agreement was provided by Spain's location relative to that of the other Central European countries. Essentially, the Iberian peninsula was seen by military strategists as the rear area of the European defense system, which was out of range of the majority of Soviet short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (71:258). Therefore, Spain could be used as a forward staging area for Spanish, American, and other allied forces without threat from these missile systems.

In addition, the nomination of Juan Carlos as King of Spain in 1969 to succeed Franco made an agreement with Spain seem less distasteful due to the more democratic political views of the nominee (47:31).

The defense of Southwestern Europe, continued use of the Bardenas Reales bombing range for training missions, the build-up of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet, the closure of other United States bases in the Mediterranean area, and the necessity of assuring delivery of Mid-Eastern oil, provided the U.S. with adequate justification for continued retention and use of military installations within Spanish territory.

Why Spain Wanted the 1970 Agreement

Spain continued to view its relationship with the United States as a means of achieving parity with the rest of Western Europe.

As noted earlier, Spain asked for \$1.2 billion in 1968 (85:6). The request served to notify the U.S. that the costs of its Spanish bases would not be cheap.

In addition, Spain wished to have wording within the agreement that would have provided for formalization of relations in the context of a mutual defense treaty (65:4293; 71:241). This stronger relationship with the United

States was hoped to provide support for Spain's entry into the European Common Market (62:16235).

Further reason for a continued relationship with the United States was provided for by the Spanish need to further modernize its military forces. Here, the Franco government requested a second "Hawk" anti-aircraft missile battalion, radar pickett ships, and F-4 "Phantoms" (64:30897).

Another important motive that Spain had for continuing its partnership with the U.S. was the prohibitive costs involved for membership in NATO. Although the Spanish already provided part of the NATO alert system, it would have cost Spain more than \$628 million in its own defense budget to upgrade their military forces to NATO standards (66:29904). In this instance, it was much cheaper for Spain to charge the United States for the use of bases than to incur the cost to meet NATO standards.

Terms of the 1970 Agreement

The Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation of 1970 provided a broader relationship with Spain than did the Pact of Madrid of 1953. Although military and economic interests were included within the text, it also furnished cooperation and assistance from the United States in the fields of science and technology, urbanization, environment, oceanography, education, and agriculture (71:262-265).

What Spain Received. The Spanish received Grant Aid in the amount of \$25 million to be divided between military training and hardware (66:26972). In furtherance of the agreement, the U.S. agreed to provide Spain Export-Import Bank credits to purchase thirty-six F-4C Phantom fighter/bombers to include accessories and equipment, together with three P-3 and two KC-130 aircraft,

helicopters, and equipment for the territorial command net of the Spanish Army (71:268). Fifty million dollars was given to the Spanish government to modernize and semi-automate the existing aircraft control and warning system, while five destroyers, two submarines, six landing ships, and one tanker were loaned to the Spanish Navy (66:26972; 71:268).


In addition, the United States government made available on a grant basis, machine tools appropriate for use in the manufacture of munitions, relinquished ownership of the Rota-Zaragoza oil pipeline, and renounced any and all claims against structures constructed under the Pact of Madrid of 1953 (66:26972; 71:268-269).

What the United States Received. In return for the numerous concessions made by the United States to Spain under the 1970 agreement, the American government, for the main part, was assured of continued use of the Spanish bases.

The gunnery/bombing range of Bardenas Reales (see Figure 4) was to be used for air-to-ground training of well over one-half of U.S. military forces stationed in the European Theater (71:276). "There is no other existing facility where the same training can be conducted [71:271] ."

Continued use of the six-thousand acre complex located at Rota was considered vital to support operations throughout the Mediterranean and Eastern Atlantic (71:272). The naval base provided shore facilities, harbor installations, housing, support facilities for Polaris submarines, and an airfield for anti-submarine warfare and reconnaissance aircraft. In addition, a central weather station, plus fuel and ordinance depots helped supply the U.S. 6th Fleet with data and stores necessary for its continued effectiveness in the Mediterranean region (71:272).

FIGURE 4
THE BARDENAS REALES RANGE



Other military installations approved for continued United States occupation were Torrejon, Zaragoza, and Moron (in standby status). The principal uses of these air bases were viewed as a point of embarkation and debarkation for military airlift, and as staging areas for augmentation forces to reinforce Central Europe or the eastern Mediterranean (71:271).

The Question of the Use of Bases. Although the Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation of 1970 did allow the United States to use the bases under normal (non-war) conditions, some question arose as to what limitations might be imposed by Spain if the United States were to become involved in armed conflict.

Although the Spanish had allowed the United States the use of the facilities to evacuate personnel from Lebanon in 1958 and the Congo in 1964, Spain did restrict their use during the Middle-East crisis of 1967 (71:220-221). In fact, the United States was not allowed to use any of the Spanish air bases for military operations during any crisis involving the Arab States and Israel (73:48).

The formation of a Joint Committee on Defense Matters under the terms of the 1970 agreement was to assist in the resolution of such disagreements between the United States and Spain. In fact, the purpose of the committee was

. . . to establish the necessary coordination between the two governments and to insure greater effectiveness of the reciprocal defense support granted by the two governments to each other . . . [71:266].

Further responsibility of this Joint Committee was to determine the use of the Spanish facilities in the event of attack against the security of the West.

In the case of external threat or attack against the security of the West, the time and manner of the use by the United States of the facilities . . . to meet such threat or attack will be the subject of urgent consultations . . . in the Joint Committee [73:6].

Summary of the 1970 Agreement

In essence, the Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation of 1970 provided for a much broader relationship between the United States and Spain than did the Pact of Madrid of 1953.

Cultural exchanges in the fields of science, technology, and education, as noted earlier, were provided for as well as mutual consultation in oceanography, agriculture, and military operations.

The provision of further aid to Spain in the form of MAP funds, hardware, and FMS credits was hoped by both the United States and Spain to increase the Spanish military's capability for self-defense. While the U.S. retained occupation of bases declared vital to the security of the West.

It was with this background and these guidelines that the United States in 1974 entered into negotiations with the Spanish for a continuation of a mutual defense treaty.

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1976

Why a Treaty. The establishment of a treaty for the defense and cultural agreements between the United States and Spain in 1976 resulted from the administration's "handling" of the 1970 agreement.

Essentially, the U.S. Administration had circumvented the Congress for fear that the Senate would have taken some action to prevent the Pact from being another executive agreement (66:27721). In fact, a hearing on the 1970 agreement was called for by the State Department on two days notice. Only five members of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee were able to appear on such short notice, and were not prepared to discuss the new agreement (66:26969).

Due to the U.S. Administration's insistence that all prior hearings be closed, and the short notice given to the Senate subcommittee, the two hour session to discuss the 1970 Pact was limited to only a debate concerned with the question of a treaty or executive agreement (66:26969). The terms of the 1970 agreement were not discussed by the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee.

Representative Lowenstein of New York, on August 11, 1970, criticized the lack of a treaty. He called the actions used by the administration as "shabby behavior" and said the "hurry-up tactics" were used because of growing opposition to the 1970 executive agreement in the U.S. Congress (66:28350).

Senator J. William Fulbright stated that of the committee meetings held, all had been "sanitized by the administration for security reasons" to the point that the text of the hearings no longer represented the actual agreement (66:26969).

With the strong feeling that Congress had not been allowed to participate in the 1970 Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation, Resolution Number 85 was introduced in the U.S. Senate on June 25, 1970. This resolution, passed with a vote of 70 to 16, called for a limitation on the powers of the President of the United States to obligate the U.S. to foreign countries as concerned military and economic aid. It further called for such obligation to be in the form of a treaty (65:17214-17245).

With the wording of the 1970 executive agreement termed as "vague" by Senator J. William Fulbright, (D., Ark) Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and a call by both Senators Fulbright and Jacob K. Javits (R., N.Y.) for the "Pact" to be submitted as a treaty, the stage had been set for the next negotiations involving the United States and Spain (66:26716-26717).

The Death of Franco. With both high-ranking military and civilian leaders within Spain calling for Franco to step down, increasing pressure was brought to bear upon the Spanish government for political reform (26:2).

In June of 1975, President Ford's visit to Spain was evidence of the decreased political power held by Franco. In fact, the President spent more time with Franco's appointed replacement, Juan Carlos, than with Franco himself (28:2).

Then, in November 1975, Franco's death occurred and Juan Carlos was approved by the Spanish Cabinet as the King of Spain (27:20). With this historic event, a new agreement with the Spanish would be easier for the United States public and Congress to accept (28:2).

Why the United States Wanted an Agreement. The placement of King Juan Carlos on the throne provided added incentive for the United States to support the democratic ideals held by the new King. In a statement by Senator Dick Clark of Iowa, made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, much emphasis was placed on the role of the United States "to assist this process of Spanish evolution towards democracy [74:4]." Further evidence of U.S. Support for the new regime in Spain was provided by Senate Resolution 401 which stated that an agreement with Spain

. . . will serve to support and foster Spanish progress toward democracy and toward complete Spanish participation in the institutions of Western Europe . . . [74:6].

Defense of Western security was another reason for a continued American-Spanish relationship. President Gerald R. Ford, in a letter of transmittal to the Senate of the United States on February 18, 1976, stated:

In the area of western security, the agreement provides for a continuation of the important contribution made by Spain through facilities and related military rights accorded United States forces on Spanish territory [72:76].

In relation to the above contribution to western security, the United States was still trying to prepare Spain for entry into NATO. Ambassador Robert J. McCloskey said that the intention of a treaty with the Spanish is

... to develop in a bilateral fashion with Spain a military relationship which is comparable to that the United States shares with the NATO members ... the end objective would be looking toward eventual Spanish membership within NATO [74:15].

The need for bases in Spain continued to be realized as other events in the Mediterranean area weakened United States influence in the region. The conflict between Greece and Turkey made reliance on these allies doubtful (25:15). The Portuguese and Italian governments were threatened by communist domination, and it was surmised that the loss of United States air bases in the Azores would soon occur (41:35; 49:39).

Why Spain Wanted an Agreement. Spain continued to request large amounts of aid from the United States to update its military hardware and economic positions. The Spanish began negotiations with a request of \$1.5 billion dollars for the United States' continued right to use air bases situated in Spain (46:2).

Another objective of the Spanish was full integration with other Western European countries (76:5). In support of this policy, Spain saw a full defense treaty with the United States as a means of expanding its contacts with the rest of the world and promoting its international status (67:56656-56662; 76:5).

When and How the Treaty was Passed. In the fall of 1974 negotiations on a new agreement between the United States and Spain had begun. The U.S. wanted to extend the 1970 Agreement of Cooperation and Friendship for a period of five years, while the Spanish insisted upon a completely new agreement. The new arrangement proposed by Spain entailed a closer military relationship to the

United States, similar to that enjoyed by the NATO countries (71:240, 273, 279; 73:31, 24).

Demands by the Spanish government initially started with a request for a binding defense agreement with the United States. However, it became evident to Spain that the United States Congress would not support a full defense commitment (67:H10022; 74:31).

When Spain realized that a security commitment could not be obtained from the U.S., the Spanish decided that an increased amount of aid would be necessary for the United States' utilization of the defense installations. With this change in tactics, each service of the Spanish Armed Forces submitted a list of the equipment required. The total dollar figure for these lists amounted to over \$1 billion (19:9; 71:241).

After the myriad of details upon which the United States and Spain differed were resolved, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and Spanish Foreign Minister D. Jose Maria de Areilea Martinez-Rodas Areilza signed the new accord on January 24, 1976 (79:9). The agreement was then presented to the United States Senate for approval as a treaty.

Hearings in the United States Congress on the proposed treaty with Spain were concerned with cost, NATO, the United States' defense obligation, and the new Spanish Regime.

Although the treaty could be termed as a "billion-dollar treaty" by Spain, the cost to the American taxpayer would amount to only \$170 million. The rest of the quid pro quo was made-up of U.S. government guarantees for loans through the Export-Import Bank (74:44).

Another point stressed by Congress, as in past negotiations with the Spanish, was the possible detrimental effect that a treaty with Spain would have

on U.S. relations with other NATO countries. However, testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in March 1976 provided "that there is certainly no evidence of any hostility among our NATO allies toward the new United States-Spanish treaty [74:20] ."

Further concern, voiced by many in the U.S. Senate, was given to the United States' obligation for the defense of Spain. In essence, the Senate did not want the treaty to contain wording that would obligate the United States to the defense of the Spaniards (74:31). The Senate was assured by Ambassador Robert I. McCloskey that the treaty neither explicitly nor implicitly obligated the U.S. to come to the defense of Spain (74:30).

The argument for the treaty appeared to be that the U.S. Senate wanted to assist Spain in becoming more democratic under the King Juan Carlos regime. Even though Juan Carlos had just assumed the throne in Spain the previous year, by 1976 political prisoners were being released and the harsh restrictions placed upon the Spanish people under Franco were being eased (11:3).

On May 19, 1956, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the treaty with a vote of 10 to 2 (30:3).

The United States Senate approved the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1976 on June 21, 1976, by a vote of 88 to 0 (67:59979). In addition to the ratification, the Senate also passed a resolution 91 to 4 that urged Juan Carlos to move toward democracy (13:6).

On October 8, 1976, President Ford signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1976, together with its supplementary agreements and exchanges of notes, thereby putting into effect all terms and conditions within the text of the new treaty (79:3).

Terms of the Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation of 1976

What the United States Received. The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1976 provided the United States with the defense installations it considered important in the support of NATO and the Mediterranean area.

Essentially, the establishment of the United States-Spanish Council in the terms of the treaty provided for a closer relationship between the two countries. The Council was to be chaired by the Spanish Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State. To perform its duties as specified under the treaty, the U.S.-Spanish Council consisted of a Joint Economic Committee, a Joint Scientific and Technological Affairs Committee, a Joint Educational and Cultural Affairs Committee, and a Joint Committee for Politico-Military Administrative Affairs (79:11). The purpose of this council and its subcommittees was to develop the Spanish economy and military so that eventual integration into European military and economic affairs would occur (72:2).

Under the same supplementary agreement, the establishment of a Joint Military Committee was also agreed upon by both countries. This council was chaired by the two Chiefs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (79:11). The purpose of the military committee was to coordinate those military activities in Spain, such as joint exercises, and to establish contingency planning in areas of common interest. In a statement on the Joint Military Council by Harry E. Bergold, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs):

The planning coordination will be in the context of a Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe generally and will be designed to develop active roles for Spanish forces to complement existing Western plans and operations [72:3] .

In addition to the coordination provided by the U.S.-Spanish Council, the United States acquired continued utilization of the Spanish-U.S. installations.

Spain's Canary Islands occupied a favorable position with respect to oil shipments from the Persian Gulf to Europe via the Atlantic Narrows. Torrejon Air Bases provided facilities to support an F-4 tactical fighter wing and also served as a major reinforcement airlift base. Zaragoza Air Base provided 70 percent of the air-to-ground and 50 percent of the air-to-air weapons training for U.S. forces located in Europe. Moron Air Base was programmed to receive C-130 squadrons in support of SACEUR during wartime (72:4-5).

Similarly, the U.S. Navy installation at Rota provided munition and petroleum support for naval forces in the Western Mediterranean and Eastern Atlantic (72:5).

Five tropospheric scatter sites were located on Spanish land. These sites provided long haul, high-density communications support for United States Forces and government activities in the Mediterranean, Middle-East, and Africa (72:5).

What Spain Received. The Spaniards, under the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1976, received over \$1.25 billion in loans, grants, and assistance for the five-year term of the agreement.

Under the broader relationships established in the treaty, the United States issued repayment guarantees in its foreign military sales program in the amount of \$120 million per year, committed \$450 million in credits and guarantees to Spanish companies from the Export-Import bank, and \$12 million in educational grants. In addition, the United States also provided the Spanish with \$75 million of aid for military equipment, \$10 million grant aid for military training, \$50 million for modernization of the aircraft control and warning network, and \$23 million in scientific research grants (79:15, 34, 36, 76, 83).

Further agreements, in the attached letters to the treaty, provided for the lease of forty-two F-4E aircraft to Spain in the amount of \$53 million for the five year period, and the sale of thirty-four F-4C aircraft back to the United States for \$55 million (79:85). Hence, the Spanish were to gain \$2 million on the deal.

Additional concessions granted to the Spanish included a reduction in the number of KC-135 tankers to a maximum of five, the withdrawal of nuclear submarines stationed at Rota by July 1, 1979, and assistance in obtaining five naval vessels (72:79; 74:8).

Results of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1976

Although the Spanish economy experienced a slump during 1975, attributed to the death of Franco, the monetary aid provided for under the aegis of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1976 contributed to the economic stability of Spain (77:4). This stability during the country's transition from the government of Caudillo Franco to the government of King Juan Carlos did much to restore the world's confidence in the future of the Spanish economy (77:5). This confidence was strengthened by the growth in GNP from \$8 billion in 1960 to over \$100.6 billion in 1976, preliminary signs indicated that the Spanish economy was making a strong recovery from the worldwide recession of 1975 (77:4).

The treaty with the United States also provided to Spain the prestige it needed to soften the prejudices of the European countries that had existed since WW II. In fact, Ambassador McCloskey said: "Some of the historical attitudes of Europeans toward Spain are changing . . . [11:3]" for the better.

With these changes in world attitudes, coupled with Spanish industrial production ranked in the top ten nations, Spanish entry into the European Common Market appeared close to realization (78:4).

It has now been agreed that Spain itself should become a full EEC member, and membership negotiations are expected to begin in 1979. These negotiations are unlikely to be completed before 1982 [78:9].

Further support for Spain's continued advancement to a liberal form of government was provided by the treaty. With this aid and assistance from the United States, King Juan Carlos proposed the Law of Political Reform before the Spanish people in the winter of 1976. On December 15, 1976, the referendum won overwhelming approval and the way was made clear for the first free elections since the fall of the Spanish Republic in 1936 (21:16). This law called for the abolishment of the Franco-era parliament (the Cortes) and provided for a slow, but steady evolution to a democratic system.

The military posture of Spain continued to improve with the introduction of such modern equipment as the AMX-30 heavy tank, TOW and Dragon anti-tank weapons, and Skyguard air defense systems to the Spanish Army (21:8). The Navy had acquired modern weaponry in the form of SH-3D helicopters and Harpoon SSMs, while the Air Force was strengthened by reconnaissance aircraft consisting of RF-4s and RF-5As (21:8).

CHAPTER V

CURRENT UNITED STATES INTERESTS IN SPAIN

As stated earlier, the United States' interest in Spain became well known in 1953 with the executive agreement that established a U.S.-Spanish relationship known as the Pact of Madrid. In subsequent years five-year extensions of the ten-year "Pact" were negotiated in 1963 and 1970. Finally, the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed on January 24, 1976, establishing a much broader relationship between the United States and Spain.

Although the United States appeared to have initially become involved with the Spanish for military and defense purposes only, the broader relationships established under the terms of both the 1970 agreement and the 1976 treaty served to expand American interests in Spain's political, economic, and cultural future.

Political Interests

With the event of Franco's death in 1975 and the establishment of a democratically inclined Chief of State, King Juan Carlos, the relationship of the United States with a rightist authoritarian regime came to an end. This occurrence in Spanish and world history served to relieve tensions in the American political system, as well as reduce frictions in U.S. relations with other democratic states, particularly those located in Northern Europe (21:4).

In this context, the United States has continually supported and encouraged King Juan Carlos' efforts to direct Spain towards a more democratic government. A report to the Senate Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle-East stated:

. . . American national interests are served best by continued progress toward democracy in Spain, and that whatever bilateral problems emerge along the way should be examined in a context of support for that process [21:5].

In furtherance of the above concern, the United States has also supported a closer association of Spain with western democracies in the hope that the Spanish evolution towards democracy will be strengthened. In fact, "joining Europe" was one of the specific objectives cited by King Juan Carlos after his succession to Chief of State (21:5).

Economic Interests

The United States' economic interests in Spain revolve around exports and investment.

Although the Spanish standard of living does not yet compare with that of other Western countries, Spain is considered to be one of the top ten industrialized nations of the world. In this regard, it has increasingly become more attractive to the United States as a desirable place for financial investments (2:5). As a matter of fact, "in Spain, U.S. investments are larger than those of any other foreign country [21:6]."

In addition to investments, the United States also exported to the Spanish market well over \$2.1 billion of American goods and services in 1977. The American Embassy views this trade as just the "beginning," with additional demands by Spain in the future for equipment to provide electrical power, enhanced construction capabilities, oil production, and coal mining capabilities, all of which will increase the Spanish level of exports (21:5-6).

Military and Security Interests

Perhaps the largest interest of the United States in Spain lies with the Iberian Peninsula's strategic and military importance to the defense of the Western world.

NATO. In essence, the U.S. has continued to strive to assure that Spain could be depended upon to contribute to Western defense in the event of an East-West confrontation in Europe (21:7). Although the Spanish have not joined NATO, the experts have stated that if Spain were a member of the alliance

... that some of the problems resulting from France's nonparticipation in NATO's integrated command would be ameliorated; NATO would enjoy more flexible and dependable lines of logistics support and communications ... [2:7].

In the earlier relationship between the United States and Spain, both countries tried to acquire Spanish entry into NATO. Time and again this effort was thwarted by those NATO members who wanted nothing to do with the Franco dictatorship (21:7).

After Franco's death in 1975, an easing of tensions between Spain and the Western European countries began, and today a Spanish application would most probably be approved by all NATO members (21:7). However, new political factions in the Spanish parliament, composed of socialists and communists, have effectively split Spain's government and prevented the majority vote needed for an application to formally affiliate with NATO (21:25).

United States Military Objectives. Basically, the United States military objectives in the Mediterranean area are concerned with Soviet aggression and deterrence. In a report to the Senate Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle-East, submitted by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congress-

sional Research Service, Library of Congress, both general and specific concerns were outlined as follows:

General Objectives

1. To deter Soviet armed aggression against NATO states and other nations of the Middle-East.
2. To project sufficient power to provide an effective defense should deterrence fail.
3. To encourage peace and stability in the Middle-East.

Specific Objectives

1. To maintain the strength of NATO's southern flank.
2. To maintain Free World supply lines in the Mediterranean area.
3. To support friendly states outside of NATO, particularly Israel.
4. To deny the Soviet Union use of the Suez Canal in time of war [22:5].

These objectives evolved as the result of the United States' efforts to maintain a military balance of power with the Soviet Union. They have been implemented through the establishment of relationships and treaties with Mediterranean countries (22:5).

Spain has served as one of the most important Mediterranean countries with which the United States has established a defense relationship. In this regard, a geographic area of common interest was defined in the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1976 (see Figure 5) (79:28).

Major United States Military Installations (see Figure 6).

Rota Naval Base serves as one of the key United States military installations in Spain. Located seventy nautical miles west of Gibraltar at Cadiz, Rota is in a

FIGURE 5
GEOGRAPHIC AREA OF COMMON INTEREST




FIGURE 6
MAJOR UNITED STATES MILITARY INSTALLATIONS



"geographically superb position to cover the western approaches to Gibraltar, the Western Mediterranean, as well as the Eastern Atlantic . . ."which greatly emphasizes ASW capabilities by means of ASW aircraft launched out of its major airbase (22:16).

In addition, the U.S. naval base is also the prime port in the Mediterranean area for Navy logistics, and performs a key role as the maintenance and supply port for the U.S. 6th Fleet (22:16).

Rota is also an integral part of the U.S. Defense Communications system linked with Greece and Morocco, and serves as a coordination point with NATO's early warning system located in Italy (22:16).

The U.S. 16th Tactical Air Force of Europe is headquartered at Torrejon Air Base east of Madrid. This base has "a tactical fighter wing that has a strike mission assigned to it - a mission that would be launched from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey and Aviano Air Base in Italy [22:18]."

Zaragoza Air Base and Moron Air Base (currently in standby status) provided training and communications facilities respectively, while furnishing the United States with additional capability to augment military forces in both European and Mediterranean theaters (22:18).

As can be seen, the three air bases and one naval station provide the United States and NATO with an important strategic location. Loss of these bases at Rota, Torrejon, Zaragoza, and Moron would have serious detrimental impacts on both U.S. and NATO security interests in this area of the world (21:9).

If the loss of the U.S.-Spanish facilities should occur, USAFE and U.S. Naval units would have to be deployed to alternate sites.


Use of Portuguese facilities on the mainland may not be available due to the political unrest in that country, forcing ASW units to the next nearest location, Lajes in the Azore Islands. Given that the P-3 Orion ASW aircraft are only seventy nautical miles from the Straits of Gibraltar and the Western Mediterranean when launched from Rota, the distance of over one-thousand nautical miles to these same areas via Lajes would seriously affect the United States' ability to cover the "Straits" and Western Mediterranean Sea (see Figure 7) (22:23).

An actual case in point has occurred concerning the evacuation of nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines from Rota. At the time of negotiations for the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1976 the Spanish demand for such evacuation by July 1, 1979, was agreed to based on the SLBM. The Trident, which is projected to have nearly twice the effective range (four-thousand nautical miles) of the Poseidon SLBM, will increase the operating range of U.S. strategic nuclear powered submarines ten to twenty times beyond those currently available. Thus, the new SLBM would allow United States submarines to be homeported on the U.S. east coast and still achieve the distance and accuracy necessary to destroy selected targets (22:21-22).

As the deadline approaches, it now appears that the submarines stationed at Rota will be moved to Holy Loch, Scotland (21:9). This move may be necessary due to both technical and nontechnical problems experienced in the development of the Trident missile (22:22). Such a deployment would overcrowd existing facilities at Holy Loch and provide the Soviet Union with less of a problem in tracking and targeting the United States' submarine fleet (21:9).

The loss of U.S.-Spanish air bases would create similar problems in that redeployment of United States tactical fighter units to either of West Germany,

FIGURE 7
ASW COVERAGE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA BY P-3 ORION AIRCRAFT



Italy, or Turkey would serve to overcrowd existing facilities and, in some cases, require new construction (21:9; 22:22).

As stated in the Report for the United States' Congressional Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East:

Any relocation out of Spain would have the effect of reducing the operational flexibility of U.S. forces in the Mediterranean, in view of the concentration of supply points that would result. The military and political vulnerabilities of U.S. military units in the area would also be increased as the result of such concentrations [21:22-23].

Hence, loss of Spanish installations would serve to increase the factors of time and distance to the Mediterranean area, as well as concentrate United States' military forces in a smaller number of locations (22:50).

The use of Spain as a "fallback" position for Allied forces would be negated and control of entry and exit to the Mediterranean Sea would be seriously effected.

Current Support Programs

In order to support the Spanish military and provide Spain with equipment and training as agreed upon in the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1976, the United States is currently involved in several major FMS cases and Grant Aid programs in Spain. The programs discussed in this paper include Peace Sigma, Peace Alpha, the Tactical Communications Network (TCN), Combat Grande II/MADAC, and ship transfer from the U.S.N. to the Spanish Navy.

Peace Sigma. The Peace Sigma program is an effort by the United States and Spanish Air Forces to modernize and mechanize the SAF's supply and distribution systems. The first phase, which will define the Requirements and Distribution System and reorganize the logistics functions of the SAF, is projected to cost

\$2.6 million. The cost of automating this system will depend on the equipment to be selected by the SAF (40:10).

Although the USAF recommended that the SAF institute a commercial contract in the areas of writing and testing the software, the Spanish requested that USAF accomplish the task organically. Upon agreement to this end by the two air forces, this program became the first ever attempted by the United States Air Force for a foreign government (40:10).

The Peace Sigma program was still in progress in 1978, with no major problems interfering with that progress.

Peace Alpha. Under the terms of the 1976 treaty the United States agreed to sell to the government of Spain forty-two F-4E aircraft and to buy back the F-4C aircraft provided under the 1970 agreement (79:85).

Upon inspection of these aircraft by the Spanish Air Force, all were rejected due to the high number of flying hours registered and the high cost of converting from F-4C to F-4E aircraft (40:3).

Subsequently, the SAF determined that a need existed within its Air Force for improved reconnaissance capabilities. With this determination, the SAF requested that additional RF-4C aircraft be made available for Spanish purchase. The cost of the reconnaissance aircraft totaled approximately \$11 million and was to be applied to the quid pro quo terms of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1976 (40:3).

Upon delivery of four RF-4C aircraft to Spain in July 1978, project Peace Alpha was initialized to provide IMET training at a cost of \$179,000 for twenty-five photo specialists. This money was obligated out of FY78 IMET funds for Spain (40:2-3).

The Tactical Communications Network. This program was initiated to provide a multi-million dollar, sophisticated command and control network for the Spanish Army with the purpose of integrating Spain's internal military communications systems. It was funded by the Spanish and was to be tailored to their specific needs (35:19).

However, the authors of this paper found that serious problems in the program have resulted in making a discussion of the program inadvisable. Because of the sensitivity of the situation, current information was not available.

Combat Grande II/MADAC. This program is to provide Spain with technology necessary to automate the Spanish civil air traffic control network (40:12).

In this endeavor, Combat Grande II was to cost \$100 million with the United States providing \$50 million as given in the terms of the Treaty of Friendship and cooperation of 1976. MADAC (Madrid Automated Center) was to cost approximately \$80 million, funded entirely by the Spanish government (40:13).

Although both programs are intended to update Spain's civil air traffic control, the Combat Grande II program provides for further integration and modernization of the Spanish radar defense system.

The major features of Combat Grande II are:

. . . a back-up Sector Operations Center, collocated with MADAC . . . , a new radar site in NW Spain . . . , microwave system expansion and improvements, interface with SA Hawk Missiles, an increase in interceptor control capability, and improvements to the Canary Islands air defense system [40:12].

The major features of the MADAC program are an "Automated Enroute Traffic Control Center (ACC) at Torrejon [40:12]" and the construction of four

Automated Terminal Area Control Centers at Madrid, Barcelona, Palma, and Sevilla/Malaga (40:12).

United States Navy Ship Transfers. Under the conditions of the 1976 treaty, the United States offered to transfer four mine sweepers (MSO) to the Spanish Navy (SN). However, the SN refused the vessels due to their poor material condition (82:1).

Now, the SN has requested the transfer of three diesel powered submarines and a Paul Revere class amphibious transport (LPA) to satisfy all unfulfilled U.S.-Spanish treaty/agreement commitments. As of March 15, 1979, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations had taken this request under advisement, with transfer of the submarines and one LPA pending U.S. government approval (82:1).

Current Restrictions on U.S.-Spanish Facilities

Though the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1976 states that "the air and naval bases . . . may be utilized for flights by . . . United States aircraft . . . in transit through Spain . . ., [79:71]" there appears to be some question as to the United States' "unlimited rights" in the use of the Spanish facilities in support of Israel. In fact, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Harry E. Bergold, Jr., stated that the United States would be "clearly obligated to consult with the Spanish" concerning the use of the bases (22:20).

Since the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, the Spanish powers to place restrictions on the use of American installations in Spain has left no doubt that the United States "can no longer take for granted stopover rights at Spanish air bases for U.S. warplanes on their way to Middle-East trouble spots [1:8]."

Further evidence of Spanish restrictions occurred when F-15s bound for Saudi Arabia were rerouted, after a Spanish Government request, from Torrejon Air Base to Lajes Field in the Azore Islands (1:8).

Although the use of Spanish facilities in support of Israel has not been completely ruled out by Spain, it appears that the placement of restrictions will be determined by the world energy situation and Spain's internal political situation. In a report for the United States Congress Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle-East it was stated:

. . . it is fair to presume, given Spain's energy dependence on, and close ties with, the Arab countries, that any permission for such use could be denied, depending in part on the political situation in Spain at the time [21:9].

This same report further stated:

. . . whatever the actual value of the Spanish bases to the United States, it is essential to note that operations staged from these facilities are subject to Spanish review and consent in most cases [21:9-10].

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Up to this point in the thesis, the authors' primary attention has been focused upon the Major U.S.-Spanish agreements since 1953 and their effects upon the two countries. Now, the authors will draw their conclusions and recommendations regarding the United States-Spanish relationship from the previously documented data. It must be stressed at this juncture of the thesis that this analysis represents solely the authors' points of view and in no way reflects the philosophy or policies of the United States government or its agencies, except where both may coincide.

Conclusions

The conclusions of this study will be presented by answering each of the research questions posed by the authors in Chapter I. The overall research question will be answered following the secondary research questions.

Research Question 1. What commitments has the United States made to Spain regarding Spain's security as a result of military agreements between the two governments?

The United States' relationship with Spain was formally recognized in 1953 with the executive agreement known as the Pact of Madrid. Although the Spanish government at this time was adjudged to be a dictatorship under Francisco Franco, the United States foresaw Spain's geographic position as an

important strategic and defensive location to halt or deter the communist influence from the East. Due to Spain's weaknesses, both economically and militarily, the initial relationship between the two countries was a reciprocal arrangement in which the United States received the authority to utilize the Iberian Peninsula for defensive purposes, while Spain received economic and military assistance on a grant basis.

Although wording in the 1953 agreement did not directly define a defense commitment to Spain by the United States, it was in the best interests of both countries to build up Spain's military forces. Both the United States and Spain wanted the Spaniards to acquire the ability of self-defense.

Underlying the United States' commitment to modernize the Spanish armed forces was the overall objective of the defense of the West. To this end, an indirect commitment made within the U.S. government was to provide Spain with the necessary armament and military capability for acceptance into NATO (71:221).

As the power of the Soviet Union and its allies increased, Spain became increasingly aware of the risks it was accepting on behalf of the NATO countries without the benefits enjoyed by the member nations. Hence, the Spanish sought an agreement in 1970 with the United States that would provide a defense commitment covering Spain equal to that which covered the NATO countries.

Although the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1976 expanded the defense relationship between the United States and Spain, it did not commit the U.S. to the actual defense of the Spaniards, except as such defense pertained to the security of the West. In Senate Resolution 401:

. . . the United States while recognizing that this treaty does not expand the existing United States' defense commitment in the North Atlantic Treaty area or create a bilateral defense commitment

between the United States and Spain, looks forward to the development of such an expanded relationship between Western Europe and a democratic Spain . . . [74:6].

In order to strengthen western security as a whole, the United States agreed to provide the Spanish with economic and military assistance in the hopes of providing the NATO Alliance with a powerful and friendly ally in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean areas.

Research Question 2. What effect has the assistance provided to Spain had on the Spanish economy?

After the Spanish Civil War of 1936, Spain's economy was on the brink of total collapse. Through WW II, and into the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Franco government could do little to improve the economic situation.

The Pact of Madrid of 1953 and its extensions provided Spain with the economic aid the Spanish government required to start the country on the road to economic recovery. GNP began to show a marked increase and Spanish industry began to increase its output for competition in world markets.

With the renegotiation of the 1953 Pact in 1970 and the ratification of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1976, the relationship between the United States and Spain acquired a broader base. Under these two agreements, Spain received assistance from America in physics research, reactor technology, agricultural research, and educational research which provided the Spanish with new techniques for increased manufacturing and agricultural production.

An indirect result of this aid to Spain was the stability of the economy, which assisted Spain in making the transition from the dictatorial regime of Franco to the liberal government of Juan Carlos in 1976, and provided support for Spain's possible entry into the European Common Market.

Research Question 3. What effect has the relationship between the United States and Spain had on Spain's internal politics?

Following WW II, the "free world" denounced the Spanish government as a right-wing, authoritarian dictatorship. Although the United States was one of these countries, its assessment of Spain's strategic and military importance outweighed all other considerations.

With the executive agreement of 1953 accomplished, one of the United States' aims was to gently push Spain towards a more democratic form of government. Even though the pressures applied by the U.S. did not force Franco's early retirement, some evidence of the relaxation in Spain's repressive policies became apparent as early as 1963 when Franco began to relax restrictions on Spanish press agencies.

Franco nominated Juan Carlos as the successor to the throne of Spain in 1969. This nomination provided further incentive to the United States government to support the Spanish, because of the nominee's known inclination towards democracy.

Upon Franco's death in 1975, Juan Carlos assumed the position as the King of Spain. In order to show support for the new Chief of State, the United States entered into the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1976. This, the first treaty since the renewal of relations with Spain in 1953, served to provide the new Spanish government with improved international status. Thus, the death of Franco, the appointment of Juan Carlos as King, and the support of the United States served to strengthen Spain's progress towards a more liberal, democratic government.

As evidence of this move, the Spanish passed the Law of Political Reform in 1976. This law legalized several political parties and paved the way for free elections that were held in June 1977.

Research Question 4. What effect has the military assistance provided to Spain had on the military posture of Spain?

United States assistance to Spain in the form of MAP, FMS, and guaranteed loans from the Export-Import Bank has had a definite impact on Spain's military posture.

The modernization of Spanish military forces has continually been the aim of such assistance. If a comparison is made of just the Spanish Air Force, it can be seen that the acquisition of F-4 aircraft over the past 15 years can hardly be compared with the propeller driven, WW II-vintage aircraft Spain owned in the early 1950s.

A similar comparison could be accomplished with Spain's Army and Navy as well. A very substantial beginning has been made through U.S. assistance to equip both of these services with modern aircraft, artillery, tanks, and vessels through which Spain can provide its own defense.

Assistance in the areas of technical and professional military training has served to provide the Spanish with a competent officer and support corps. The upgrade of pilots and Spain's radar system has enhanced the command and control structure of the modern Spanish military, while the Peace Sigma program is computerizing the SAF logistics systems.

As evidence of Spain's abilities, the Spanish military forces train on the same bases and ranges with their American counterparts, have equipment nearly equal to that of the U.S. forces, and perform in effective and efficient joint military exercises. In addition, the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1976 promises U.S. assistance to Spain in the purchase of seventy-two F-16, or similar, aircraft to insure the continued upgrade of Spanish weaponry.

The Overall Research Question. What have been the military relationships between Spain and the United States since 1953 and how have these relationships affected Spain?

The relationships that have existed and are in existence today have been detailed in Chapters III and IV, beginning with the Pact of Madrid of 1953, its extensions, and the broader relationships as outlined under the terms of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1976. Excerpts of the actual agreements and treaty are provided as part of the appendix.

The effect of these agreements upon the Spanish government, economy, and military cannot be denied. Spain has progressed from a dictatorship to a democratic country. Its economy is still growing and Spanish industrial power is now recognized as one of the top ten in the world. The military has acquired modern hardware and training, providing Spain with acceptance into NATO if the Spanish government should so desire (21:25).

The future of a continued Spanish-U.S. relationship appears to be good. Spain provides the United States, and indirectly NATO, with needed communications and radar links in the Mediterranean and Eastern Atlantic areas. The United States provides Spain with much needed assistance for continued use of Spanish military facilities and additional assistance in obtaining modern military equipment.

However, it is the author's opinion that Spain could raise the price for use of the Spanish facilities to the point that it would no longer be economically feasible for the United States to maintain forces on Spanish soil.

Also, it is feasible that technology could increase to the point that the United States would no longer need forward operating bases from which to deter Soviet expansionism. Some examples of recent technological advances which decrease the need for forward operating bases are: spy and communications

satellites, Trident nuclear and cruise missiles, and the development of the Advanced Tanker/Cargo Aircraft (ATCA).

In any case, it is not the author's purpose here to provide an evaluation of future U.S.-Spanish relationships, but to point out some of the possible problems that negotiators from both sides will have to face in ensuing years.

Recommendations

If a continued relationship with Spain exists after the five-year period of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1976 expires in 1981, studies which continue to review the reasoning for such a relationship would provide students of the United States International Logistics System some insight into the political factors inherent in U.S. FMS, Grant Aid, and military modernization programs. In relation to the above, the authors feel that a study encompassing the effects of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 and the administration's Arms Transfer Policy upon the United States' relationships with Spain, as well as other countries, would provide an increased awareness of the impact such political considerations play in the United States foreign relations programs. An example could possibly encompass the impact of the Arms export ceiling upon U.S.-Spanish relations.

APPENDIX A

The Pact of Madrid of 1953

MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND SPAIN

The Governments of the United States of America and of Spain,

Desiring to foster international peace and security, to promote understanding and good will and to maintain world peace;

Considering that the Congress of the United States of America has enacted legislation enabling the United States of America to furnish military, economic and technical assistance to Spain so that Spain may accomplish such objectives:

Desiring to set forth the undertakings and conditions which govern the furnishing of military assistance by the Government of the United States of America under such legislation and the measures which the two governments will undertake individually and together in furtherance of the above objectives:

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. Each Government will make available to the other, and to such other governments as the Parties may in each case agree upon, equipment, materials, services or other assistance in such quantities and in accordance with such terms and conditions as may be agreed. The furnishing and use of such assistance shall be consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Such assistance as may be made available by the Government of the United States pursuant to this Agreement will be furnished under the provisions and subject to all the terms, conditions and other provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 and the Mutual Security Act of 1951, acts amendatory or supplementary thereto and appropriation acts thereunder. The two Governments will, when it is considered necessary, negotiate detailed arrangements necessary to carry out the provisions of this paragraph.

2. Both Governments will utilize this assistance exclusively for the promotion of international peace and security, in accordance with arrangements satisfactory to both Governments, and will not, without prior and mutual consent, devote such assistance to purposes other than those for which it was furnished.

3. Arrangements will be entered into under which equipment and materials furnished pursuant to this Agreement, and no longer required for the purposes for which originally made available, will be offered for return to the country which furnished such equipment and materials.

4. Without prior and mutual consent, neither Government shall transfer to any person outside that Government or to any other nation, title to or possession of any equipment, materials, property, information, or services received under this Agreement.

5. The Government of Spain will take such security measures as may be agreed in each case between the two Governments in order to prevent the disclosure or compromise of classified military articles, services or information furnished pursuant to this Agreement.

6. Each Government will take appropriate measures consistent with security to keep the public informed of operations under this Agreement.

7. The two Governments will establish procedures whereby the Government of Spain will so deposit, segregate or assure title to all funds allocated to or derived from any program of assistance of the United States so that such funds shall not be subject to garnishment, attachment, seizure or other legal process by any person, entity or government when in the opinion of the United States any such legal process would interfere with the attainment of the objectives of the said program of assistance.

ARTICLE II

The two Governments will, upon request of either of them, negotiate appropriate arrangements between them providing for the methods and terms of the exchange of patent rights and technical information for defense which will expedite such exchanges and at the same time protect private interests and maintain security safeguards.

ARTICLE III

1. The Government of Spain, in addition to its commitments under other agreements with the Government of the United States, undertakes to make available to the Government of the United States pesetas for the use of the latter Government for its administrative and operating expenditures in connection with carrying out the purposes of the United States foreign aid program. The two Governments will forthwith initiate discussions with a view to determining the amount of such pesetas and to establishing arrangements for the adequate furnishing thereof.

2. The Government of Spain will, except as otherwise agreed to, guarantee duty free treatment on importation or exportation and exemption from internal taxation upon products, property, materials or equipment imported into its territory in connection with this Agreement or any similar Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of any other country receiving military assistance.

3. a. The operations and expenditures effected in Spain by or on behalf of the Government of the United States for the common defense effort including those carried out as a consequence of any other foreign aid program will be relieved from all taxation. To this end the Spanish Government will prescribe pertinent procedures satisfactory to both parties.

b. A Technical Annex attached to this Agreement and authorized by it will establish the terms and general procedures for the implementation of this paragraph.

c. The tax relief authorized above will apply to those operations and expenditures of the United States which are authorized by the Defense Agreement and arrangements to be concluded thereunder and the Economic Aid Agreement as concluded between the two Governments.

ARTICLE IV

1. The Government of Spain will admit personnel of the Government of the United States who will discharge in Spanish territory the responsibilities acquired under this Agreement and who will be accorded facilities to observe the progress of the assistance made available. Such personnel who will be United States nationals, including personnel temporarily assigned, will, in their relations with the Government of Spain, operate as a part of the Embassy of the United States of America under the direction and control of the Chief of the Diplomatic Mission, and will have the same status as that of other personnel with corresponding rank of the Embassy of the United States of America. Upon appropriate notification by the Government of the United States the Government of Spain will grant full diplomatic status to an agreed number of personnel designated under this Article.

2. The Government of Spain will grant exemption from import and export duties on personal property imported for the personal use of such personnel or of their families and will take adequate administrative measures to facilitate and expedite the importation and exportation of the personal property of such individuals and their families.

ARTICLE V

1. The Government of each country will:

a. Join in promoting international understanding and goodwill, and maintaining world peace;

b. Take such action as may be mutually agreed upon to eliminate causes of international tension;

c. Fulfill the military obligations which it has assumed in multilateral or bilateral agreements or treaties to which both Governments are parties.

2. The Government of Spain will:

a. Make, consistent with its political and economic stability, the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities, and general economic condition to the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free world;

b. Take all reasonable measures which may be needed to develop its defense capacities; and

c. Take appropriate steps to insure the effective utilization of the economic and military assistance provided by the United States.

3. Both Governments are prepared to cooperate in international efforts to obtain agreement on universal regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate safeguards against violation or evasion.

ARTICLE VI

In the interest of their mutual security the Government of Spain will cooperate with the Government of the United States in taking measures designed to control trade with nations which threaten the maintenance of world peace.

ARTICLE VII

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature; and will continue in force until one year after the receipt by either party of written notice of the intention of the other party to terminate it, provided that the provisions of Article I, paragraphs 2 and 4 and arrangements entered into under Article I, paragraphs 3, 5 and 7, and under Article II and Article III, paragraph 3, shall remain in force unless otherwise agreed by the two Governments.

2. The two Governments will, upon the request of either of them, consult regarding any matter relating to the application or amendment of this Agreement.

3. This Agreement shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations by the Government of the United States of America.

In witness whereof the respective representatives, duly authorized for the purpose, have signed the present Agreement.

Done at Madrid, in duplicate, in the English and Spanish languages, both texts authentic, this 26th day of September, 1953.

APPENDIX B

Defense Agreement Implementing the
Pact of Madrid of 1953

AD-A072 621 AIR FORCE INST OF TECH WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH SCHOOL--ETC F/G 5/3
MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATES SINC--ETC(U)
JUN 79 J T ROBERTS, E P RUHMANN

AIR FORCE INST OF TECH WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH SCHOOL--ETC F/G 5/3
MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATES SINC--ETC(U)
JUN 79 J T ROBERTS, E P RUHMANN

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
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DEFENSE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND SPAIN

Preamble

Faced with the danger that threatens the western world, the Governments of the United States and Spain, desiring to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security through foresighted measures which will increase their capability, and that of the other nations which dedicate their efforts to the same high purposes, to participate effectively in agreements for self defense;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

In consonance with the principles agreed upon in the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, the Governments of the United States and of Spain consider that the contingencies with which both countries may be faced indicate the advisability of developing their relations upon a basis of continued friendship, in support of the policy of strengthening the defense of the West. This policy shall include:

1. On the part of the United States, the support of Spanish defense efforts for agreed purposes by providing military end item assistance to Spain during a period of several years to contribute to the effective air defense of Spain and to improve the equipment of its military and naval forces, to the extent to be agreed upon in technical discussions in the light of the circumstances, and with the cooperation of the resources of Spanish industry to the extent possible. Such support will be conditioned as in the case of other friendly nations by the priorities and limitations due to the international commitments of the United States and the exigencies of the international situation and will be subject to Congressional appropriations.

2. In consequence of the above stated premises and for the same agreed purposes, the Government of Spain authorizes the Government of the United States, subject to terms and conditions to be agreed, to develop, maintain and utilize for military purposes, jointly with the Government of Spain, such areas and facilities in territory under Spanish jurisdiction as may be agreed upon by the competent authorities of both Governments as necessary for the purposes of this agreement.

3. In granting assistance to Spain within the policy outlined above, as the preparation of the agreed areas and facilities progresses, the Government of the United States will satisfy, subject to the provisions of paragraph one, the minimum requirements for equipment necessary for the defense of Spanish

territory, to the end that should a moment requiring the wartime utilization of the areas and facilities arrive, from this moment, the requirements are covered to the extent possible as regards the air defense of the territory and the equipment of the naval units; and that the armament and equipment of the Army units be as far advanced as possible.

ARTICLE II

For the purposes of this agreement and in accordance with technical arrangements to be agreed upon between the competent authorities of both Governments, the Government of the United States is authorized to improve and fit agreed areas and facilities for military use, as well as to undertake necessary construction in this connection in cooperation with the Government of Spain; to station and house therein the necessary military and civilian personnel and to provide for their security, discipline and welfare; to store and maintain custody of provisions, supplies, equipment and material; and to maintain and operate the facilities and equipment necessary in support of such areas and personnel.

ARTICLE III

The areas which, by virtue of this Agreement, are prepared for joint utilization will remain under Spanish flag and command, and Spain will assume the obligation of adopting the necessary measures for the external security. However, the United States may, in all cases, exercise the necessary supervision of United States personnel, facilities, and equipment.

The time and manner of wartime utilization of said areas and facilities will be as mutually agreed upon.

ARTICLE IV

The Government of Spain will acquire, free of all charge and servitude, the land which may be necessary for all military purposes and shall retain the ownership of the ground and of the permanent structures which may be constructed thereon. The United States Government reserves the right to remove all other constructions and facilities established at its own expense when it is deemed convenient by the Government of the United States or upon the termination of this Agreement; in both cases the Spanish Government may acquire them, after previous assessment, whenever they are not installations of a classified nature.

The Spanish state will be responsible for all claims made against the United States Government by a third party, in all cases referring to the ownership and utilization of the above-mentioned land.

ARTICLE V

The present Agreement will become effective upon signature and will be in force for a period of ten years, automatically extended for two successive periods of five years each unless the termination procedure hereafter outlined is followed.

At the termination of the first ten years or of either of the two extensions of five years, either of the two Governments may inform the other of its intention to cancel the Agreement, thus initiating a consultation period of six months. In the event concurrence is not reached on extension, this Agreement will terminate one year after the conclusion of the period of consultation.

In witness whereof the respective representatives, duly authorized for the purpose, have signed the present Agreement.

Done at Madrid, in duplicate, in the English and Spanish languages, both texts authentic, this 26th day of September, 1953.

APPENDIX C

The 1970 Extension of the Pact of Madrid

1970 AGREEMENT OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION
BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND SPAIN

SIGNED AUGUST 6, 1971

The Governments of the United States of America and Spain,

Conscious of the desires of their respective peoples for peace, security and the maintenance of their independence, and

Recognizing that the security and integrity of each of the two countries continues to be a matter of concern to the other, and

Inspired by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and

Desiring to reaffirm and to further the friendship between their peoples, in the spirit of the Treaty of Friendship and General Relations signed at Madrid July 3, 1902, and

Desiring to establish on a more comprehensive basis the cooperation between the two Governments, which has been fostered by such friendship, so that both Governments, through mutual exchanges and support, may promote the well-being and progress of their peoples, enabling them to meet effectively the challenges of the modern world,

Have agreed as follows:

CHAPTER I

General Cooperation

Article 1. -- The Governments of the United States and Spain will continue their close cooperation and intimate working relationship, including regular mutual consultation by their Foreign Ministers, other members of the Governments, or their representatives, on all matters of common concern or interest, as deemed desirable by the two Governments.

Article 2. -- Such cooperation and relationship will be developed in those areas in which they have heretofore existed; in new areas deemed by the two Governments to require their urgent mutual attention, as specifically provided hereinafter; and in those other areas which the two Governments may consider appropriate in the future.

CHAPTER II

Educational and Cultural Cooperation

Article 3. -- In recognition of the importance of the cultural achievements of both countries, and in order to strengthen even more the friendship and understanding that traditionally have existed between their peoples, the Governments of the United States and Spain agree to expand their present exchanges in the educational and cultural fields, in number as well as in scope, subject to the constitutional processes and legislative requirements of the two countries.

Article 4. -- The expansion of these exchanges will involve teachers, research experts, scientists, scholars and students, and will extend into all branches of learning, especially natural and applied sciences, economics and the language and culture of the two countries. In the field of arts and letters both Governments will sponsor visits of authors and artists and the reciprocal dissemination of their works.

Article 5. -- Both Governments recognize the importance of the Fulbright-Hays program to promote educational and cultural exchanges between the two countries, and therefore they consider it desirable to expand the responsibilities of the Commission for Cultural Exchange between the United States of America and Spain established by the Agreement of October 16, 1958, and renewed by the Agreement of March 18, 1964. The Spanish Government reaffirms its decision to contribute regularly to the financing of the Fulbright-Hays program.

Article 6. -- In its desire to cooperate with the Spanish Government in the expansion of the Spanish educational system and Spanish scientific and technical development, the Government of the United States, subject to United States legislation and the appropriation of funds by the Congress, will assist Spain in research, development, and advanced training of professors and other teaching personnel, particularly in the scientific disciplines, and training of new professors and other teaching personnel, and will provide documents, equipment, and materials for research laboratories and libraries as appropriate in the new Spanish universities and other centers of higher learning.

Article 7. -- In order to accomplish the goals of Article 6, the Government of the United States will consider with the greatest interest the specific programs that Spain presents to it in the fields mentioned in Article 6, and will cooperate in such programs, lending such assistance as the United States may provide subject to United States legislation and the appropriation of funds by the Congress. To the extent necessary and appropriate, these matters will be the subject of special agreements between the appropriate authorities of the two Governments.

Article 8. -- The two Governments consider it a matter of special interest to increase the knowledge of their respective languages in the two countries, by encouraging the activities of institutions and organizations that engage in the teaching of Spanish and the dissemination of Spanish culture in the United States, and at the same time encouraging the activities of institutions

and organizations in Spain that carry on similar work with respect to the language and culture of the United States.

CHAPTER III

Scientific and Technical Cooperation

Article 9. -- Since science and technology are increasingly important for the development of a country, the Governments of the United States and Spain recognize that scientific and technical cooperation will be of great value in advancing the bonds of friendship, the state of the sciences and the resolution of the problems they share in common. Both Governments also recognize the desirability of devoting special attention to cooperation in the exchange of the results of scientific and technical research for their mutual economic and social benefits.

Article 10. -- Both Governments will undertake a broad program of scientific and technical cooperation for peaceful purposes.

Article 11. -- The cooperation between the two Governments will be based essentially on the following principles:

(a) Selection of specific scientific and technical sectors of major interest and yield.

(b) Preparation of plans for collaboration between research centers of the two countries.

(c) Programs for sending to Spain American professors and researchers of established reputation to cooperate in the advanced training of scientific and technological researchers.

(d) The establishment of appropriate channels for putting into operation, developing and supervising specific programs of scientific and technical cooperation.

Article 12. -- For the purposes of this Chapter, the two Governments consider the following areas, among others, to be of special interest:

(a) Civil uses of atomic energy, in accordance with the agreement of August 16, 1957, as amended.

(b) The exploration and use of space, including intercontinental experiments with satellite communications, in accordance with the exchange of notes of September 18, 1964, and January 26, 1965; spaceship tracking stations and operations, in accordance with the exchange of notes of April 14, 1966; and the measurement of winds and temperatures at high altitudes, in accordance with the exchange of notes of April 14, 1966.

(c) Marine sciences, including joint biological, physical and ecological projects to improve and increase the oceanic resources and their use.

(d) Medical and biological sciences, industrial technology, electronics and social sciences.

Article 13. -- Any obligations arising pursuant to this Chapter shall be subject to the constitutional processes and legislative requirements of the respective countries.

CHAPTER IV

Cooperation on Environmental and Urban Development Problems

Article 14. -- The Governments of the United States and Spain recognize that among the principal problems with which their peoples are faced are the dangers to which man is exposed by the deterioration of his environment. Both Governments agree on the need to give urgent attention to such problems and they will begin consultations in order to determine how to coordinate their mutual efforts for their solution.

Article 15. -- Cooperation for the purposes stated in the foregoing Article will be effected through the exchange of information, the development of teaching and research centers, the training of personnel in specialized institutions, the sending of experts, and the supply of material for carrying out projects of common interest.

Article 16. -- The fields in which cooperation will be developed will be as follows:

- (a) The fight against pollution in all its forms, especially in the atmosphere, in waters and in the soil;
- (b) Ecology and wildlife conservation;
- (c) Urban and regional planning, including urban renewal and improvement, traffic control, reduction of noise, and protection of the landscape.

CHAPTER V

Agricultural Cooperation

Article 17. -- The Governments of the United States and Spain recognize that the agricultural sector is of great mutual interest and that it may hold opportunities for exchange of knowledge and assistance; therefore the two Governments agree to study expanding their cooperation in this field.

Article 18. -- For the purpose of developing the cooperation referred to in the preceding Article, both parties will study the harmonization of standards and common agricultural sanitation provisions; the possibility of carrying out

transactions in agricultural surpluses under a system of concessional sales for social or charitable purposes; the preparation of joint plans for teacher training, not only in the classic agricultural disciplines (e.g. agronomy, zootechny, genetics, soil science, horticulture, agricultural engineering) but also in the more modern branches (e.g. food technology, marketing of farm products, rural economics and sociology, forest management); the feasibility of exchange of university professors and agricultural researchers of both countries; scholarships for graduates in agricultural sciences; and the exchange of information on scientific and technical progress in agriculture.

Article 19. -- In the cooperation between the two Governments, special attention will be given to the Spanish programs of rural management, irrigation, reforestation, and the development of the livestock industry.

Article 20. -- The two Governments will undertake to exchange their technical knowledge and experience acquired in the sectors named in the preceding Article, whenever possible, including information on the economic aspects of the agricultural market, and to that end they will promote the exchange of technicians and experts in the preparation and execution of such programs.

CHAPTER VI

Economic Cooperation

The Governments of the United States and Spain, desiring to maintain and expand their present cooperation, have examined the situation of their economies in the world context and have reaffirmed their determination to advance and develop their economic relations, and to that end they have agreed as follows:

Article 21. -- The two Governments reaffirm their determination to expand their trade relations, and consequently they will seek to avoid, insofar as possible and to the extent allowed by their respective economic situations and the development of their balances of payments, measures that effect restrictions on the flow of their reciprocal trade, in accordance with the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Article 22. -- The two Governments consider it desirable to have a normal flow of United States direct investments in Spain, and to that end they will adopt, provided the United States balance of payments so permits, the necessary measures for encouraging the development of such investments. A similar criterion shall be applied, insofar as circumstances permit, to reducing restrictions imposed by the United States for balance of payments reasons on the purchase of foreign securities, including Spanish securities, by United States citizens in the United States.

Article 23. -- The two Governments recognize that the loans granted by the Export-Import Bank of the United States have been an important stimulus for the purchase of United States capital goods by Spanish enterprises. Consequent-

ly, they will continue in the future to facilitate and give maximum attention to the development of these financial relations.

Article 24. -- The Government of Spain reiterates its objectives of achieving by progressive steps its full integration in the European Community. The Government of the United States declares its sympathetic understanding of Spain's objectives of full integration. The two Governments agree to consult with each other and to keep in close contact in seeking to arrive at mutually satisfactory solutions for any problems of principle or procedure as may arise for either of them in this connection.

Article 25. -- The two Governments will exchange information on the negotiations now in progress for the establishment of a generalized system of preferences in favor of developing countries.

Article 26. -- The two Governments reaffirm their interest in continuing the consultations of the Joint Spanish-United States Economic Committee created in 1968, maintaining the competence and terms of reference vested in it in the exchange of notes of July 15, 1968, for the examination of financial and other economic matters of mutual interest. The Committee will meet alternatively in Washington and Madrid at mutually convenient times, under the chairmanship of representatives of appropriate level designated by their respective Governments.

CHAPTER VII

Cooperation with respect to Public Information

Article 27. -- The Governments of the United States and Spain recognize the value and significance that have been attained in present times by the information media, and they reaffirm their interest in strengthening their cooperation in this field.

Article 28. -- In order that public opinion in their respective countries may develop a better mutual understanding, both Governments will encourage by means at their disposal the exchange of radio and television programs, will mutually assist their respective information media, and will prepare an effective long-range plan for exchange in all fields of information dissemination.

Article 29. -- The two Governments reaffirm their desire to continue and to expand the exchange of their respective official publications.

CHAPTER VIII

Cooperation for Defense

The Governments of the United States and Spain are in agreement in considering that the threat to peace is the greatest problem faced by the modern world, and that it requires that both Governments remain vigilant and continue to develop their ability to defend themselves against such a threat. Consequently, both Governments, within the framework of their constitutional processes, and to the extent feasible and appropriate, will make compatible their respective defense policies in areas of mutual interest, and will grant each other reciprocal defense support as follows:

Article 30. -- Each Government will support the defense system of the other and make such contributions as are deemed necessary and appropriate to achieve the greatest possible effectiveness of those systems to meet possible contingencies, subject to the terms and conditions set forth hereinafter.

Article 31. -- The Government of the United States agrees to support Spanish defense efforts, as necessary and appropriate, by contributing to the modernization of Spanish defense industries, as well as granting military assistance to Spain, in accordance with applicable agreements. This support will be conditioned by the priorities and limitations created by the international commitments of the United States and the exigencies of the international situation and will be subject to the appropriation of funds by the Congress, whenever the case so requires, and to United States legislation.

Article 32. -- The Government of Spain, subject to Spanish constitution provisions and legislation in force, will authorize the Government of the United States to use and maintain for military purposes certain facilities in Spanish military installations agreed upon by the two Governments. Any major construction that may be necessary for the exercise of this use shall be subject to agreement between the two Governments in the Joint Committee created in Article 36 of this Chapter. The United States is further authorized to station and house the civilian and military personnel necessary for such use; to provide for their security, discipline and welfare; to store and guard provisions, supplies, equipment and materiel; and to maintain the services necessary for such purposes. The exercise of the functions authorized herein shall be subject to such express terms and technical conditions as the two Governments may agree upon.

Article 33. --

(a) The Government of Spain assumes the obligation of adopting the security measures necessary for the exercise of the functions authorized in Article 32. The United States may exercise the necessary supervision and protection of its personnel, equipment and materiel.

(b) The above-mentioned use by the Government of the United States of facilities in Spanish military installations will be free of all taxes, charges and encumbrances. The Government of Spain will retain free of all

charges the ownership of all permanent works constructed for the purpose of this Agreement.

(c) The Government of the United States may remove at any time non-permanent constructions installed at its expense, as well as its personnel, property, equipment and materiel. However, any substantial removal prior to the expiration of this Agreement will be the subject of prior consultation of the two Governments in the Joint Committee. In the event that any such removal would bring about adverse security consequences, the two Governments will consult immediately in order to adopt appropriate measures.

(d) Whenever the Government of the United States relinquishes a facility authorized in this Chapter, either prior to or as a result of the expiration of the five or ten year period specified in Article 38, the Government of the United States shall not be obligated to leave such facility in the same state and condition it was in prior to its utilization by the Government of the United States, or to compensate Spain for not having returned it in such state, but shall leave the land and permanent constructions thereon in serviceable condition for use by Spanish authorities, provided that the Government of the United States shall incur no additional expense thereby.

(e) In normal circumstances any substantial increase in the personnel or military equipment of the United States in Spain, or any substantial increase in the use by the United States of facilities in Spanish military installations regulated by this Agreement, will be the subject of prior consultation in the Joint Committee and agreed upon between the two Governments through diplomatic channels.

Article 34. -- In the case of external threat or attack against the security of the West, the time and manner of the use by the United States of the facilities referred to in this Chapter to meet such threat or attack will be the subject of urgent consultations between the two Governments, and will be resolved by mutual agreement in light of the situation created. Such urgent consultations shall take place in the Joint Committee, but when the imminence of the danger so requires, the two Governments will establish direct contact in order to resolve the matter jointly. Each Government retains, however, the inherent right of self-defense.

Article 35. -- Both Governments consider it necessary and appropriate that the cooperation for defense regulated by this Chapter form a part of the security arrangements for the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas, and to that end they will endeavor to work out by common accord the liaison deemed advisable with the security arrangements for those areas.

Article 36. -- In order to establish the necessary coordination between the two Governments and to ensure greater effectiveness of the reciprocal defense support granted by the two Governments to each other, the Governments of the United States and Spain agree to establish a Joint Committee on defense matters. The Joint Committee will be the organ in which the two Governments normally will consult with each other and resolve matters that may arise in connection with the reciprocal defense support referred to in this Chapter. The

Joint Committee will be organized and will function as specified in the Annex of this Agreement.

Article 37. -- The two Governments will determine by common accord, through an exchange of notes on this date, the facilities referred to in Article 32 of this Chapter, as well as the United States force levels in Spain and the assistance programs referred to in Article 31 of this Chapter. Thereafter any change in the number or extent of such facilities will be negotiated in the Joint Committee and agreed upon between the two Governments through an exchange of notes.

CHAPTER IX

Final Provisions

Article 38. -- This Agreement shall enter into force on September 26, 1970, and will remain in force for five years, whereupon it may be extended, if both Governments agree, for another five years.

Article 39. -- In order to facilitate the withdrawal of the personnel, property, equipment and materiel of the Government of the United States located in Spain pursuant to Chapter VIII of this Agreement, a period of one year, during which the withdrawal must be completed, is provided. Such withdrawal shall be commenced immediately upon the expiration of the five year initial period, or, if the Agreement is extended, upon the expiration of the five year extension period. During the withdrawal period above mentioned, not to exceed one year, all of the rights, privileges and obligations deriving from Chapter VIII of this Agreement shall remain in force as long as United States troops remain in Spain.

Article 40. -- The entry into force of this Agreement will in no way affect the validity or terms of any agreement existing between the Governments of the United States and Spain, with the exception of the Defense Agreement between the United States and Spain, dated September 26, 1953, and its supplementary agreements which shall thereupon be superseded.

Done at Washington in duplicate, in the English and Spanish languages, each of which shall be equally authentic, this sixth day of August, 1970.

For the Government of the United States of America:

WILLIAM P. ROGERS
Secretary of State

For the Government of Spain:

GREGORIO LOPEZ BRAVO
Minister of Foreign Affairs

ANNEX

1. The Joint Committee established in Article 36 of Chapter VIII of the Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation Between the United States of America and Spain signed on August 6, 1970, will be composed of the Foreign Minister of Spain and the United States Ambassador to Spain as Co-Chairmen, with the Chief of the Spanish High General Staff and the Commander-in-Chief United States European Command as their military advisers.

2. The Joint Committee will be permanent throughout the term of the aforesaid Agreement and shall be organized so as to function on a continuous basis.

3. The Joint Committee shall have its headquarters in Madrid, but may hold meetings in other places at the request of either of the two Governments, such places to be determined by mutual agreement.

4. A permanent Secretariat of the Joint Committee shall be established composed of two members representing each of the two Governments, who shall be charged with the daily handling of routine matters and the preparation of those matters which must be submitted to the Joint Committee for consideration.

5. The Joint Committee will establish such subcommittees as may be appropriate for the discharge of its responsibilities.

6. Subordinate to the Joint Committee, as a Subcommittee thereof, there will be a Joint Air Control and Coordination Center, to maintain and operate a system of warning for air space defense, to assist in the regulation of air traffic, and to provide a means for coordination of the actions of the U. S. and Spanish forces. The details of the organization and initial tasks of the Joint Air Control and Coordination Center will be determined by the Joint Committee within two months following the entry into force of this Agreement.

7. The Joint Committee will be assisted by the civilian and military personnel necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes.

8. The Joint Committee shall report to the two Governments on its activities on a monthly basis, and in all cases when the importance of the matter so indicates.

9. The Joint Committee shall prepare and present to both Governments an annual plan to facilitate making compatible their respective defense policies in areas of mutual interest pursuant to Chapter VIII of the aforesaid Agreement.

10. The Government of Spain will provide adequate premises for the Joint Committee. The Co-Chairmen shall determine personnel and administra-

tive needs and arrange for the preservation of the Joint Committee's records and archives.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
Washington, D. C., August 6, 1970

August 6, 1970

His Excellency GREGORIO LOPEZ BRAVO
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain

DEAR MR. MINISTER: During the Fiscal Year 1971, the United States Government would be prepared to fund up to \$3 million of such non-military projects as may be agreed upon pursuant to the Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation signed between the United States and Spain on this date.

Additionally, the Commission for Educational Exchange between the United States and Spain (Fulbright Commission) is now devoting its efforts to educational reform. Apart from the above mentioned \$3 million, the Department of State expects to increase its contribution to the Commission this year, thus enhancing its capacity to contribute to the fulfillment of the Spanish educational plan.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM P. ROGERS

August 6, 1970

His Excellency GREGORIO LOPEZ BRAVO,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and Spain signed today, August 6, 1970. In accordance with Article 37 of the Agreement, I wish to advise you that the intentions of my Government regarding military assistance for Spain, pursuant to Article 31 of the Agreement, which I understand are acceptable to the Government of Spain, are as follows:

(a) The United States Government is prepared to assist the Government of Spain to apply Export-Import Bank credits to the purchase of the following equipment:

36 F-4C Phantom fighter bomber aircraft including necessary accessories and ground equipment for 36 aircraft.

2 KC-130 aircraft.

3 P-3 aircraft.

4 SH-3D helicopters.

4 Huey Cobra helicopters.

6 C-130 A or B aircraft.

Equipment for the territorial command net of Spanish Army.

(b) The Government of the United States will seek to obtain from Congress the necessary funds for the following purposes:

(1) Coverage of 70% of the cost, which is not expected to exceed a total of \$50 million, of modernizing and semi-automating the existing aircraft control and warning network in Spain.

(2) Training of Spanish personnel to operate and maintain the United States origin military equipment acquired by Spain.

(3) Military equipment for land forces:

1 battalion of M48 tanks (54).

2 battalions and 2 batteries of 105 MM Howitzer M108 (48).

1 battalion of 155 MM Howitzer M109 (18).

1 battalion Armored Personnel Carriers:

49 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers;

4 M106 Mortar Carriers; and

7 M577 Command Post Carriers.

16 Huey UH -- 1H helicopters.
1 battalion of 175 MM Guns M107 (12).

(c) The Government of the United States intends to loan to the Government of Spain the following vessels, subject, where necessary, to obtaining authorizing legislation:

Type, quantity, and class of ship:
Submarines, 2, Guppy 1A and 11A.
Destroyers, 5, Various: English, Sumner, Lavalette, Lloyd Thomas.
Ocean minesweepers, 4, Aggressive.
Landing ships, 3 LST, Chelan County.
Auxiliaries, 1 ammunition ship, Wrangell; 1 oiler, Cimarron.

(d) The Government of the United States is prepared to make available to Spain machine tools appropriate for use in the manufacture of munitions, subject to specific agreements with the Government of Spain.

(e) The Government of the United States is prepared to relinquish to Spain the Rota-Zaragoza pipeline, subject to the provisions of a procedural annex.

(f) The Government of the United States relinquishes any and all claims against the Government of Spain for the residual value of the permanent structures constructed under the Defense Agreement between the United States of America and Spain signed September 26, 1953.

I further wish to advise you that it is the understanding of my Government that the United States of America, subject to Spanish Constitutional provisions and legislation in force, is authorized to use and maintain for military purposes with the appropriate military personnel the facilities in or connected with the following Spanish military installations:

Torrejon Air Base.
Zaragoza Air Base.
Moron Air Base (standby).
Rota Naval Base.
Cadiz-Zaragoza petroleum pipeline and pumping facilities.
Petroleum and other storage facilities.
Communications and navigational network support facilities.

I should appreciate your confirmation of the foregoing understandings on behalf of the Government of Spain.

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Secretary of the State of the
United States of America

APPENDIX D

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1976
and Supplementary Agreements

SENATE ACCEPTANCE

June 21, 1976

RESOLVED, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and Spain, signed at Madrid on January 24, 1976, together with its seven Supplementary Agreements and its eight related exchanges of notes (Executive E, Ninety-fourth Congress, second session) subject to the declaration that:

(1) the United States, recognizing the aspiration of Spain to achieve full participation in the political and economic institutions of Western Europe, and recognizing further that the development of free institutions in Spain is a necessary aspect of Spain's full integration into European life, hopes and intends that this Treaty will serve to support and foster Spain's progress toward free institutions and toward Spain's participation in the institutions of Western European political and economic cooperation;

(2) the United States, while recognizing that this Treaty does not expand the existing United States defense commitment in the North Atlantic Treaty area or create a mutual defense commitment between the United States and Spain, looks forward to the development of such an expanded relationship between Western Europe and a democratic Spain as would be conducive to Spain's full cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its activities and mutual defense obligations;

(3) the United States, recognizing that this Treaty provides a framework for continued nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes with Spain, looks forward to a continued relationship in this field commensurate with steps taken by Spain toward becoming a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or placing all of its nuclear facilities under safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency;

(4) Senate advice and consent to ratification shall be understood to apply only to the initial five-year period of the Treaty, so that any United States agreement to an extension of the Treaty shall require the further advice and consent of the Senate; and

(5) the sums referred to in the Supplementary Agreement on Cooperation Regarding Materiel for the Armed Forces and Notes of January 24, 1976, appended to the Treaty, shall be made available for obligation through the normal procedures of the Congress, including the process of prior authorization and annual appropriations, and shall be provided to Spain in accordance with the provisions of foreign assistance and related legislation.

Attest: FRANCIS R. VALEO
Secretary

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION
BETWEEN SPAIN
AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The Governments of Spain and of the United States of America;

Impelled by their shared concern for the maintenance of world peace and security;

Affirming that their cooperation is beneficial for the security of both countries; strengthens the defense of the West; plays an important part in the security arrangements for the North Atlantic and Mediterranean areas; and contributes to the achievement of their shared goals;

Desiring to reaffirm and strengthen the friendship between their peoples and to continue and enrich the cooperative relationship which exists between the two countries, in the spirit of the Declaration of Principles between Spain and the United States of America, of July 19, 1974;

Agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

The close cooperation between the two countries on all matters of common concern or interest will be maintained and developed on a basis of sovereign equality. This cooperation shall encompass economic, educational, cultural, scientific, technical, agricultural, and defense matters, as well as other matters upon which they may mutually agree.

The Governments of Spain and the United States of America will keep their cooperation in all these areas under continuous review and seek to identify and adopt all appropriate measures for carrying out this cooperation in the most effective manner possible with a view to maintaining a balance of benefits, equal and effective participation of both parties, and coordination and harmonization of their efforts with those which may be being made in other bilateral and multilateral contexts.

For these purposes, a Spanish-United States Council is established under the chairmanship of the Foreign Minister of Spain and the Secretary of State of the United States of America. The functions and organization of the Council are set forth in Supplementary Agreement Number One. The Council will meet at least semi-annually.

ARTICLE II

Given the increasing international importance of economic affairs, the two parties will seek to develop their economic relations so as to ensure mutual benefit under conditions of equitable reciprocity and to promote, in particular, cooperation in those fields which facilitate development. That cooperation shall also take into account the impact which the state of the economy of each country has on its defense efforts. Their economic relationship will be carried out in accordance with Supplementary Agreement Number Two.

ARTICLE III

Given the relations of friendship which exist between the peoples of Spain and the United States of America, and recognizing that science and technology are essential factors in meeting the growing needs and in furthering the general economic development of both countries, the two Governments will carry out a broad program of scientific and technical cooperation for peaceful purposes. In the framework of that cooperation, they will direct their efforts principally to areas having the most significance to the social and economic welfare of their peoples, and to developmental progress. Their relations in these areas will be carried out in accordance with Supplementary Agreement Number Three.

ARTICLE IV

In order to continue to expand their cooperation in the educational and cultural fields with a view to furthering the familiarity of their peoples with the important cultural achievements of the other and to strengthen the friendship and understanding between their peoples which provide the necessary foundation for the overall cooperative relationship between the two countries, their relations in these areas will be carried out in accordance with Supplementary Agreement Number Four.

ARTICLE V

Having recognized that their cooperation has strengthened the security of the Western World, and contributed to the maintenance of world peace, there is established a defense relationship between Spain and the United States of America. Consistent with the Declaration of Principles of July 19, 1974, they will, through this defense relationship, seek to enhance further their own security and that of the Western World. To such end, they will seek to develop the appropriate plans and coordination between their respective armed forces. This coordination will be carried out by a coordinating body as set forth in Supplementary Agreement Number Five.

To further the purposes of this Treaty, the United States of America may use specific military facilities on Spanish territory, in accordance with the provisions set forth in Supplementary Agreement Number Six. The two parties will also, for these ends, cooperate in the acquisition as well as the production of appropriate materiel for their armed forces, in accordance with the provisions of Supplementary Agreement Number Seven.

ARTICLE VI

In view of the contribution the use of the facilities mentioned in Article V makes to the defense of the West, the parties, through mutually agreed steps, will seek on the basis of reciprocity and equality to harmonize their defense relationship with existing security arrangements in the North Atlantic area. To this end, they will, periodically, review all aspects of the matter, including the benefits flowing to those arrangements from the facilities and make such adjustments as may be mutually agreed upon.

ARTICLE VII

This Treaty and its Supplementary Agreements shall enter into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification between the two Governments and will remain in force for five years, whereupon they may be extended for an additional five year period if the parties so agree.

ARTICLE VIII

In order to facilitate the withdrawal of the personnel, property, equipment and materiel of the Government of the United States of America located in Spain pursuant to Article V of this Treaty and its Supplementary Agreements, a period of one year from the termination of the Treaty is provided for the completion of withdrawal which will begin immediately after such termination. During that one year period, all the rights, privileges and obligations deriving from Article V and its Supplementary Agreements shall remain in force while United States forces remain in Spain.

DONE in Madrid, this 24th day of January, 1976, in duplicate, in the English and Spanish languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

HENRY A. KISSINGER

FOR SPAIN:

J. AREILZA

SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT
ON
THE UNITED STATES-SPANISH COUNCIL
(Number 1)

ARTICLE I

The United States-Spanish Council will be responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. It will review the cooperation under that Treaty; examine any problems which may arise as well as measures which might be taken to deal with them; consider steps to facilitate and improve United States-Spanish cooperation; and submit to the Governments such findings and recommendations as may be agreed. The Council will also be charged with carrying out the consultations provided for in Article III of Supplementary Agreement Number Six.

ARTICLE II

The Council will be chaired by the Secretary of State of the United States and the Foreign Minister of Spain, and will meet at least semi-annually. Each Chairman will have a Deputy who will serve as Permanent Representative on the Council and assure its functioning in the absence of his Chairman. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of each party or their designated representatives will be permanent military representatives on the Council. The parties shall designate such other representatives and advisors to the Council and its subsidiary bodies as they deem appropriate, taking into account the variety of matters which may be before the Council at any particular time, and the need for adequate representation on the Council from responsible ministries and departments.

ARTICLE III

The Council will have under its aegis a Joint Economic Committee, a Joint Scientific and Technological Affairs Committee, a Joint Educational and Cultural Affairs Committee, and a Joint Committee for Politico-Military Administrative Affairs. It may form such other committees and subsidiary bodies as may be deemed appropriate to facilitate the performance of the Council's functions.

The Committees and other subsidiary bodies will seek to resolve problems and advance cooperation in their areas of competence to the fullest extent possible without formal referral to the Council. They shall periodically report to the Council on matters which have come before them, actions taken, progress made, and make appropriate recommendations to the Council.

The Council will be assisted by a Permanent Secretariat under the joint direction of a United States and a Spanish Secretary, with appropriate staffing mutually agreed upon.

ARTICLE IV

In order to establish the necessary coordination between them and to ensure greater effectiveness of the reciprocal defense support granted by each to the other, the two parties agree to establish a Joint Military Committee dependent on the Council composed of the two Chiefs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or their designated representatives, which shall meet semi-annually.

Dependent on this Committee and as a working body, there shall be constituted a Combined Military Coordination and Planning Staff, as provided in the Supplementary Agreement on Bilateral Military Coordination.

The respective co-directors of this Combined Staff shall serve as permanent representatives of the Chairmen of the Joint Military Committee.

ARTICLE V

For the purpose of obtaining the maximum effectiveness in cooperation for Western defense, the United States-Spanish Council, as one of its basic objectives, will work toward development of appropriate coordination with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In furtherance of this purpose, the Council will establish by mutual agreement a commission formed by members of the two contracting parties which shall propose to the Council specific measures to promote the establishment of meaningful coordination.

ARTICLE VI

The Council will have its seat at Madrid, where it will be provided with suitable facilities by the Government of Spain.

The administrative support for meetings of the Council and its subordinate bodies will be provided by the Spanish Government inasmuch as it is the seat of the Council. Permanent administrative costs of the Council, including salaries of any employees of the Council, will be shared equally. Each party will bear the cost of its own participation in the work of the Council, including salaries of its members of the Secretariat.

The representatives, advisors, experts and other participants of each party in the work of the Council or its subordinate bodies shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities when in the territory of the other, in accordance with the norms to be agreed.

ARTICLE VII

This Agreement will enter into force and remain in force contemporaneously with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States and Spain.

DONE in Madrid, this 24th day of January, 1976, in duplicate, in the English and Spanish languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

HENRY A. KISSINGER

FOR SPAIN:

J. AREILZA

SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT
ON
ECONOMIC COOPERATION
(Number 2)

ARTICLE I

In their economic relations, the United States and Spain will be guided by their shared desire to encourage economic growth, trade expansion, and other economic relations among nations, and by the principles contained in the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

ARTICLE II

The two Governments reaffirm their determination to intensify their commercial relations and to take all appropriate steps to encourage the growth of their respective exports. In order that this growth may take place on a basis acceptable to both parties, they will seek to avoid the development of a disequilibrium that could be mutually disadvantageous to their overall economic relationship. To this end, the two Governments will seek to avoid imposing restrictions on the flow of trade between them in accordance with their obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and other existing international agreements.

ARTICLE III

The two Governments agree on the desirability of having a normal flow of United States direct investment to Spain, and to that end they will endeavor to arrive at appropriate and mutually agreeable measures to facilitate such an investment flow, within the limits of their respective laws and international obligations.

ARTICLE IV

Both Governments recognize the importance of the role played by the Export-Import Bank of the United States both in stimulating the purchase of United States capital goods by Spanish enterprises and in assisting the progress of Spain's energy and industrial development programs, and therefore they will seek to strengthen these financial relations in the future.

To this end, the Export-Import Bank of the United States, in order to contribute to Spain's development, is currently prepared to commit credits and guarantees of approximately \$450 million for Spanish companies.

ARTICLE V

The Government of Spain reiterates its objective of achieving its full integration in the European Economic Community, and the Government of the United States declares its favorable understanding of this Spanish objective. The two Governments agree to maintain contact in seeking to arrive at mutually satisfactory solutions of any problems that may arise for either of them in this connection.

ARTICLE VI

In order to facilitate achievement of the goals established in Article II, the two Governments will reinforce their consultations regarding the most appropriate manner in which Spain can qualify for the benefits of the generalized system of preferences provided for in the United States Trade Act of 1974.

ARTICLE VII

The two Governments reaffirm their interest in carrying out a regular program of consultations on all economic matters of mutual interest. To that end, they agree to establish a Joint Economic Committee under the United States-Spanish Council. The Joint Economic Committee will monitor bilateral economic relations, discuss matters of mutual interest, seek to resolve problems which may arise, and make appropriate recommendations for furthering their economic cooperation.

ARTICLE VIII

This agreement will enter into force and remain in force contemporaneously with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States and Spain. It supersedes the Agreement of July 15, 1968, establishing a United States-Spanish Economic Committee.

DONE in Madrid, this 24th day of January, 1976, in duplicate, in the English and Spanish languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

HENRY A. KISSINGER

FOR SPAIN:

J. AREILZA

SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT
ON
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION
(Number 3)

ARTICLE I

The common efforts of the two Governments under their program of scientific and technological cooperation will, in conformity with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, be directed principally to those fields of applied research and technological development having the most significance to the social and economic welfare of the peoples of the United States and Spain. In this context, the fields of energy, industrialization, environmental and urban problems, agriculture, and natural resources are recognized as having particular importance to developmental progress. Both Governments will give early and special emphasis to these fields within the program of cooperation.

ARTICLE II

Cooperation between the two Governments will be based on the following principles:

- a. mutuality of interest;
- b. selection of specific scientific and technical sectors of major interest; and
- c. preparation of plans for collaboration between institutions and entities of the two countries.

Their cooperation and activities in the fields of science and technology will be subject to the legislative requirements of the two countries, including the annual appropriation of funds.

ARTICLE III

Cooperation may take such forms as deemed appropriate, including but not limited to:

- a. joint or coordinated planning, support, or implementation of projects and the supply of equipment;
- b. exchange of scientific and technological information, subject to the conditions agreed to by the two countries;

c. establishment, operation, and utilization of scientific and technical installations related to individual projects; and

d. exchange of scientific and technical personnel related to the cooperative projects and activities contained in this agreement.

ARTICLE IV

Cooperative programs and activities may be the subject of specific agreements for their appropriate implementation.

ARTICLE V

Scientific and technical cooperation shall be effected as follows:

a. annual programs composed of sets of specific projects financed by contributions from the United States Government;

b. special programs in which each participant will, in general, bear the costs pertaining to its obligations;

c. funding for annual and special programs shall be subject to the availability of the necessary funds.

ARTICLE VI

Cooperation in science and technology shall be coordinated through the Joint Committee for Scientific and Technological Cooperation which shall be responsible for:

a. formulation of an annual program of scientific and technical cooperation between the two countries;

b. review of all programs, activities, and operations, including the preparation of an annual report; and

c. the Joint Committee may recommend to the Governments modification, postponement, or termination of programs, where warranted, after consultation with all affected agencies and institutions.

ARTICLE VII

The annual program of scientific and technical cooperation, under this Agreement, shall be established through exchange of notes between the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy of the United States at Madrid, or through formal decision of the United States-Spanish Council, acting on the basis of recommendations of the Committee.

ARTICLE VIII

Scientific and technical information of a non-proprietary nature resulting from cooperation under this Agreement shall be made available to the world scientific community through customary channels in accordance with normal procedures.

The disposition of any patents, know-how, and other proprietary property derived from the cooperative activities shall be provided for in the specific agreements referred to in Article IV.

ARTICLE IX

Each Government will facilitate, consistent with law, the entry and exit of equipment and material to be utilized in cooperative activities under this Agreement, as well as the personal effects of scientific and technical personnel and their families.

ARTICLE X

Nothing in this Agreement shall preclude or prejudice scientific and technological cooperation outside the terms of this Agreement by institutions of the United States or Spain or by nationals of either country with each other or with third parties.

ARTICLE XI

Institutions, organizations, or entities of third countries may participate in cooperative programs or activities with the joint approval of the Governments of the United States and Spain.

ARTICLE XII

Programs and activities currently in force and established by the competent authorities shall not be affected by this Agreement. However, they may be included in this Agreement when both Governments so decide.

ARTICLE XIII

In the field of energy, both Governments consider that cooperation in research and development in nuclear and nonnuclear aspects of energy and energy conservation is important. To increase cooperation in energy research and development, both Governments will endeavor to remain within the framework of cooperation in the context of the International Energy Agency and will ensure that, to the maximum extent possible, appropriate research linkages are maintained with that organization and its member countries.

ARTICLE XIV

With respect to nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes, the areas of interest for both countries which shall receive early consideration in the development of cooperative programs and institutional agreements will include: basic physics research, reactor technology, fuel safety and treatment, radioactive metrology, contamination, and radioactive wastes.

ARTICLE XV

Cooperation in solar energy research and its applications for domestic, industrial, and agricultural use is of interest to both countries and shall receive early consideration in the preparation of the general cooperation agreements and in the development of special programs within those agreements.

Both Governments will also give consideration to cooperation on other forms of energy.

ARTICLE XVI

In the field of environmental and urban problems, both Governments recognize the usefulness of annual programs already carried out, and consider it desirable to increase this cooperation wherever possible, giving special attention to the following aspects:

- a. monitoring, reduction, and, where feasible, elimination of environmental pollution;
- b. conservation and protection of reserves and natural areas, including their fauna; and
- c. urban and regional planning directed to improvement of the quality of human life.

ARTICLE XVII

In the field of agriculture, both Governments recognize the continuing importance that cooperation holds for the peoples of each country and of the world, and will continue to encourage, as appropriate, cooperation in such programs and activities as may be of mutual interest. These may include, inter alia, agricultural scientific research, agricultural health standards, professional training, exchange of instructors and researchers, and exchange of information for technical and scientific progress in agriculture. In the development of cooperative programs, the special problems and priorities of each country shall be taken into account.

ARTICLE XVIII

In the area of natural resources, both Governments recognize the importance of research to their identification, conservation, and efficient utilization, and agree to develop and implement cooperative programs in areas to be jointly defined. Such programs may include, inter alia, information exchange, provision of expert services, specialized work experiences, and development and intensification of interinstitutional linkages. In the development of natural resources cooperation, early attention shall be given to oceanography.

ARTICLE XIX

This Agreement shall enter into force and remain in force contemporaneously with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Spain and the United States.

DONE in Madrid, this 24th day of January, 1976, in duplicate, in the English and Spanish languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

HENRY A. KISSINGER

FOR SPAIN:

J. AREILZA

SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT
ON
EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL COOPERATION
(Number 4)

ARTICLE I

Aware of the importance of the cultural achievements of the two countries and the desirability of strengthening the traditional friendship and understanding between their peoples, Spain and the United States will expand their cooperation in the educational, cultural, and scientific fields. Through the Joint Committee on Educational and Cultural Affairs they will seek to develop programs for more effective cooperation; carry out programs already approved for that purpose; seek to resolve problems that may arise; and make such recommendations as may be necessary in relation to these matters. Their cooperation and decisions in the fields of education, culture, and science will be subject to the legislative requirements of the two countries, including the annual appropriation of funds.

ARTICLE II

The program of exchanges between Spain and the United States in these fields will be expanded in both numbers and scope. The expansion will involve teachers, researchers, scientists, scholars and students and will be extended into all branches of learning, especially natural and applied sciences, economics, and the language and culture of the two countries. In the field of arts and letters, the two Governments will sponsor visits of authors and artists and encourage the reciprocal dissemination of their works.

ARTICLE III

The two Governments will cooperate in the expansion of the Spanish educational system. The United States will assist Spain in research, development, and advanced training for professors and other teaching personnel. The United States will also provide documents, equipment, and materials to educational research and teaching laboratories and libraries, as appropriate, for Spanish universities and other centers of higher learning. Both Governments will foster an exchange of cultural materials.

ARTICLE IV

Both Governments recognize the importance of the Fulbright-Hays program in promoting educational and cultural exchanges between the two

countries, through the Commission on Cultural Exchange between Spain and the United States of America. Both Governments will contribute regularly to the financing of the Fulbright-Hays program. The Commission and the Joint Committee on Educational and Cultural Affairs will cooperate as appropriate in their respective fields to reinforce the effectiveness of the action of both parties.

ARTICLE V

The two Governments consider it a matter of special interest to increase the knowledge of their respective languages in the two countries by encouraging the activities of institutions and organizations engaged in the teaching of Spanish and the dissemination of Spanish culture in the United States, and at the same time encouraging the work of institutions and organizations engaged in similar activities with respect to the language and culture of the United States.

ARTICLE VI

The annual Educational and Cultural Cooperation Program which is the subject of this Agreement will be established by exchange of notes between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy of the United States at Madrid, or by a formal decision of the United States-Spanish Council, taking as a basis the recommendations of the Committee.

ARTICLE VII

This Agreement shall enter into force and remain in force contemporaneously with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States and Spain.

DONE in Madrid, this 24th day of January, 1976, in duplicate, in the English and Spanish languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

HENRY A. KISSINGER
FOR SPAIN:

J. AREILZA

SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT
ON
BILATERAL MILITARY COORDINATION
(Number 5)

ARTICLE I

A Combined Military Coordination and Planning Staff shall be established at Madrid to facilitate coordination between the Spanish Armed Forces and the Armed Forces of the United States, as well as other forces dedicated to North Atlantic defense.

The Combined Staff will operate within the overall framework of the United States-Spanish Council and receive the Council's guidance through the Joint Military Committee. The Council will be kept apprised of the work of the staff, including all proposed joint exercises or other activities. The staff will have no command function.

ARTICLE II

The mission of the Combined Staff shall be to prepare and coordinate plans, which are in harmony with existing security arrangements in the North Atlantic area, for actions which could be taken in the geographic area of common interest as defined in Article III, in case of an attack against Spain or the United States in the context of a general attack against the West.

All such activities of the Combined Staff will take into account the requirements of the constitutional processes of the United States and Spain which must be met before any plans or other measures may be implemented.

Every effort shall be made to insure that these activities of the Combined Staff serve to complement and strengthen Western defense as a whole.

The Combined Staff shall be the vehicle to provide the Spanish Armed Forces the United States doctrine and information required to achieve the necessary strategic, tactical and logistical coordination within the area of common interest.

ARTICLE III

The geographic area of common interest is defined as follows:

- a. Spain, including adjacent air space.
- b. Atlantic area.

- (1) Northern limit: the parallel of 48 degrees north latitude to the European continent.
 - (2) Western limit: from the intersection of 48 degrees north latitude and 23 degrees west longitude, south to the parallel of 23 degrees north latitude.
 - (3) Southern limit: the parallel of 23 degrees north latitude eastward from 23 degrees west longitude to the coastal waters of the African littoral.
 - (4) Eastern limit: northward along the African coast to the Strait of Gibraltar, and thence northward along the coast of Europe to 48 degrees north latitude.
- c. Mediterranean area: from the Strait of Gibraltar to the meridian of 7 degrees east longitude.
- d. The area excludes the territory of third states and their territorial waters.

ARTICLE IV

The organization of the Combined Staff shall be established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States and Spain with the approval of the respective national authorities. The Combined Staff shall be headed by two co-directors, one from each country, both having the same general/flag rank. Administrative arrangements will be established by mutual agreement. Militarily, the staff will be responsible to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Spanish Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Military Committee.

ARTICLE V

Spanish liaison officers shall be assigned to such headquarters as are agreed upon.

ARTICLE VI

This agreement shall enter into force and remain in force contemporaneously with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Spain and the United States of America.

DONE in Madrid, this 24th day of January, 1976, in duplicate, in the English and Spanish languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

HENRY A. KISSINGER

FOR SPAIN:

J. AREILZA

SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT
ON
FACILITIES
(Number 6)

ARTICLE I

Pursuant to Article V of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and by way of contribution to the Western defensive effort, the Government of Spain grants the United States of America the right to use and maintain for military purposes the existing facilities in or connected with the Spanish military bases and installations listed in this agreement and its annex.

The facilities referred to above include those located at Rota Naval Base; the Torrejon and Zaragoza Air Bases, the Bardenas Reales firing range; and Moron, which remains on stand-by status.

The 98th Strategic Wing of tanker aircraft will be withdrawn from Spain but a detachment of a maximum of five tanker aircraft may be stationed at and use the Zaragoza Air Base. The nuclear submarine squadron will commence a phased withdrawal from Rota beginning on January 1, 1979 and this withdrawal will be completed by July 1, 1979.

Facilities within each Spanish military base or connected with it, such as lands, buildings, installations, and other major permanent items, made available for use by the United States forces, shall be listed in an inventory agreed and maintained by the parties, which indicates the purpose for which they are used. The parties will also agree and maintain a list containing the identification and general strength levels of the United States military units stationed in Spain for the use and maintenance of these facilities.

United States forces may obtain supplies by means of the Cadiz-Zaragoza pipeline, under conditions which will be agreed.

The United States will not store nuclear devices or their components on Spanish soil

ARTICLE II

The use and maintenance of the facilities authorized by Article I of this Agreement and the status of the United States forces in Spain as well as the use of the Spanish air space will be regulated by the express terms and technical conditions contained in arrangements agreed between the two Governments.

ARTICLE III

In the case of external threat or attack against the security of the West, the time and manner of the use by the United States of the facilities referred to in this Supplementary Agreement to meet such threat or attack will be the subject of urgent consultations between the two Governments, and will be resolved by mutual agreement in light of the situation created. Such urgent consultations shall take place in the United States-Spanish Council, but when the imminence of the danger so requires, the two Governments will establish direct contact in order to resolve the matter jointly. Each Government retains, however, the inherent right of self-defense.

ARTICLE IV

Through the Joint Committee for Politico-Military Administrative Affairs, the parties will seek to assure the necessary coordination between the two Governments, and to resolve such problems as may arise as a result of the application of this Supplementary Agreement.

The organization and operation of the Committee will be developed with a view to dealing effectively and expeditiously with the problems which may arise, to promoting the direct contact between military and civilian officials of both parties appropriate to these ends, and finally, to fostering the maximum cooperation in all matters of mutual concern.

Prior to the expiration of the Treaty, and no less than three months before, the Joint Committee for Politico-Military Administrative Affairs will study the modalities and timetable resulting from the application of Article VIII of the Treaty, in case the extension established by Article VII does not go into force.

ARTICLE V

This agreement will enter into force contemporaneously with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and remain in force with it and thereafter in accordance with Article VIII of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

DONE in Madrid, this 24th day of January, 1976, in duplicate, in the English and Spanish languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

HENRY A. KISSINGER

FOR SPAIN:

J. AREILZA

SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT
ON
COOPERATION REGARDING MATERIEL
FOR THE ARMED FORCES
(Number 7)

ARTICLE I

The Government of the United States will issue repayment guaranties under its foreign military sales program to facilitate the extension of loans to the Government of Spain by eligible lenders for the purpose of financing the purchase by the Government of Spain of defense articles and defense services in furtherance of the present Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The aggregate principal amount of loans guaranteed by the Government of the United States in accordance with this Article shall total \$120,000,000 during each of the five years during which the present Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation shall remain in force.

ARTICLE II

1. The Government of the United States will furnish defense articles to the Government of Spain on a grant basis with a value of \$75,000,000 over the period during which the present Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation shall remain in force.

2. In addition, the Government of the United States will continue to furnish on a grant basis training for personnel of the armed forces of Spain, the value of which shall be \$2,000,000 during each of the five years of validity of the Treaty.

3. The value of defense articles furnished under this Article will be calculated in the manner most favorable to the Government of Spain, consistent with applicable United States laws and regulations.

ARTICLE III

All defense articles or defense services furnished to the Government of Spain in accordance with this Agreement shall be furnished subject to the terms and conditions set forth in Article I of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of September 26, 1953 between the two Governments, except that Article I, paragraph 3, of that Agreement shall not apply to defense articles and defense services purchased by the Government of Spain pursuant to this Agreement. In addition to such terms and conditions, the Government of Spain agrees that the net proceeds of sale received by it in disposing of any weapon, weapons system, munition, aircraft, military vessel, or other implement of war, including scrap therefrom, furnished on a grant basis by the Government of the United States,

will be paid to the Government of the United States and shall be available to pay the official costs of the Government of the United States payable in the currency of Spain, including all costs relating to the financing of international educational and cultural exchange activities in which the Government of Spain participates. Defense articles and defense services are furnished pursuant to this Agreement exclusively for legitimate self-defense, or for participation in collective measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations or requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security.

ARTICLE IV

The Government of the United States will assign a high priority to the delivery to Spain of grant materiel agreed upon and of the necessary logistic support of the aforesaid needed materiel for the life of the Agreement.

ARTICLE V

The Government of the United States agrees to make the maximum effort to facilitate acquisition by the Government of Spain of four complete squadrons (of 18 aircraft each) of F-16 light fighter aircraft, or others of similar characteristics.

ARTICLE VI

The Government of the United States agrees to contribute to modernizing, semi-automating and maintaining the existing aircraft control and warning network utilized by the United States Air Force in Spain, in an amount not exceeding \$50,000,000.

Details of those improvements and of the maintenance and the cost-sharing arrangements shall be set forth in a subsequent implementing agreement.

ARTICLE VII

With regard to the execution of new joint utilization projects agreed to by the armed forces of the two countries, such as the case covered in the preceding article, the two parties shall mutually agree on the respective percentages of participation in such projects to be charged to the defense budget of each country.

ARTICLE VIII

The Government of the United States will offer for sale to the Government of Spain, at a favorable price consistent with applicable law, naval vessels of the following quantities and types: four MSO oceangoing minesweepers and one ARL minesweeper tender.

ARTICLE IX

The Government of the United States agrees to give prompt consideration to proposals for transfer to the Government of Spain of the technical data, equipment, and materials necessary for production in Spain of specific defense items. In each case, such production shall remain subject to specific agreement between the two Governments.

ARTICLE X

1. The Government of the United States will make available for lease to the Government of Spain 42 F-4E aircraft from the inventory of the United States Air Force the delivery of which aircraft shall be effected on the dates agreed upon.

2. The Spanish Government will pay the United States Government the amount agreed upon for lease of these aircraft. The lease may be terminated by the Government of Spain prior to expiration of the lease with one year prior notice to the Government of the United States. The lease may be extended by the Government of Spain beyond the term of the lease for an amount to be agreed upon until an equivalent number of F-16 aircraft can be made available for delivery to Spain pursuant to Article IV hereof.

3. The Government of Spain will sell to the Government of the United States 34 F-4C aircraft and F-4C specific support equipment and accessories for an amount agreed upon. The delivery of the F-4C aircraft to the Government of the United States will be concurrent with the delivery of the F-4E aircraft to the Government of Spain.

4. The Government of the United States agrees to sell to the Government of Spain the necessary spare parts and support equipment for maintenance of the F-4E aircraft until termination of the lease.

ARTICLE XI

It is expressly agreed by the two Governments that the undertakings of the Government of the United States provided for in this Agreement will be carried out in accordance with, and subject to, applicable provisions of United

States law and the appropriation of the necessary funds by the United States Congress.

The undertakings of the Government of Spain hereunder will be carried out in accordance with and subject to applicable provisions of Spanish law.

ARTICLE XII

The Agreement will enter into force and remain in force contemporaneously with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States and Spain.

DONE in Madrid, this 24th day of January, 1976, in duplicate, in the English and Spanish languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

HENRY A. KISSINGER

FOR SPAIN:

J. AREILZA

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